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"[The Constitution] does not forbid such segregation as occurs as a
result of voluntary action. It merely forbids the use of governmental
power to enforce segregation."'
[I]n Clarendon County, ... [s]even out of every ten people there
were black, the highest percentage in the state, and almost every
Negro in Clarendon lived on a farm.... Most of the land - as much
as 85 percent, lifelong residents guessed - belonged to whites, many
of them absentee owners. . . .there were 4,590 black households in
Clarendon County in 1950, and the average annual income for two
thirds of them was less than $ 1,000. Only 280 of them earned as
much as $2,000. . . .It was nothing short of economic slavery, an
unbreakable cycle of poverty and ignorance.... And a lot of them
* Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law. This article is dedicated to Karl
and Gwen, that they might learn of the freedom they are losing and must fight to regain. The
Author wishes to especially thank Marnie Mahoney, whose project is shared in this work and
whose ideas permeate all of it; and critical commentators John Hart Ely, Patrick Gudridge, Rachel
Moran, George Munstock, Steve Schnably, and my research assistants, especially Carlos
Mustelier, John Fisher, Amy Horton, and Doug Chertok.
1. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), enforced sub. nom., Briggs v. Elliot, 132
F.Supp. 776, 777 (E.D. S.C. 1955) (Parker, J., opinion by) (authorizing "freedom of choice" plans
on remand).
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did leave, for urban ghettos. . . . But wherever they went and
whatever they tried to do with their lives, they were badly disabled,
irreparably so for the most part, by the malnourishment that the pov-
erty and meanness of their Clarendon birthright had inflicted upon the
shaping years of their childhood .... [Charles Plowden - owner of
the town bank and head of the Board of Education] noted the white
people paid the taxes and the white people were therefore entitled to
the better schools .... In Clarendon County for the school year of
1949-1950, they spent $179. per white child in the public schools; for
the black child, they spent $43.
I. POWER AND DEMOCRACY - THE REHNQUIST COURT AGENDA
This essay is historically situated in the period 1975-1998, during
with time the Supreme Court was dominated by Chief Justice William
Rehnquist.3 It is about how the Court during this period restructured the
system of Constitutional interpretation in such a profound manner as to
lay to rest once and for all the conservative canard that judges neutrally
decide cases based on legal text and that therefore there is any such
fictional beast as a non-activist judge.4 Law is politics, or, more cor-
rectly, political-economics in this period of Constitutional history.5
By political economy, I mean the interdependence of the political
structure and actions of the State, with the structure and actions of rela-
tions associated with production and distribution of resources. This arti-
cle is an argument about the production of power. While the social
construction of power in the United States is by no means limited to the
2. RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 16-8 (1976).
3. For documentation of how completely the Rehnquist Court has overruled the Post
Depression Constitutional consensus, see generally, Louis SEIDMAN AND MARK TUSHNET,
REMNENTS OF BELIEF: CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES (1996). This essay differs from
their other work because of the political economy offered as explanation of the coherence of the
shift and because it offers an alternative basis for many of the same doctrines without attempting
to defend all aspects of the prior regime. See also Mark Tushnet, Forward: The New
Constitutional Order and The Chastening Of Constitutional Aspiration, 113 HARV. L. REV. 29
(1999). For the conventional political wisdom on the direction of the Rehnquist Court, see
generally, DAVID G. SAVAGE, TURNING RIGHT: THE MAKING OF THE REHNQUIST SUPREME COURT
(1992).
4. Kenneth Casebeer, The Judging Glass, 33 U. MIAMI L. REv. 59 (1978).
5. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 581 U.S. 515 (1996). Between 1975 and 1992, the
Supreme Court struck down at least twelve federal statutes on grounds that they exceeded or
violated the internal limits of enumerated powers, or on grounds of federalism. U.S. CONST. ANN.
(U.S.G.P.O., n.d.). Since then, the Court has decided, among others, United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549 (1995). In the 1996-97 term the Court struck down three more federal statutes, the
greatest number this century. (AUTHOR'S SURVEY OF A U.S. LAW WEEK, BNA, 1996-1997). The
majority of the lesser number of cases in which such powers were struck down on the basis of a
Constitutional right protecting speech in some way related to commerce, or financing of political
campaigns. On the relationship between political economy and commercial/poliical speech, see
Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
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adjudication of legal conflict, and the United States Supreme Court is
not immune to formal and informal influences of power directed towards
it, neither is the Court powerless, in conjunction with other power hold-
ers, to substantially alter the type and meaning of our democratic experi-
ence. Any such production and deployment of power in society must be
judged by the democratic accountability which such force demands in
any authentic, that is, participatory democracy.6 By the standard of
democracy measured by the experience of all in our society, the present
United States Supreme Court fails in democratic accountability, its most
basic responsibility.7
The Constitutional Law of the present Supreme Court is systemati-
cally undemocratic in content. It represents a danger for all the people
even as the Court cynically celebrates majoritarian democratic form in
the denial of civil and constitutional rights for minorities. This experien-
tially false rhetorical legal strategy deployed as power depends on two
key concepts. One is political, and the other is economic. They are
seemingly opposed yet presuppose each other-the doctrine of the
Empty State and of Nobody's Market.8
This first section identifies the agenda of the Rehnquist Court,
which has attempted to completely transform the content of the Consti-
tution over the last twenty years. In section II, the present Court's polit-
6. On the philosophical position underpinning this connection between meaning and
democracy, see Kenneth Casebeer, Work on a Labor Theory of Meaning, 10 CARDOZO L. REV.
1637 (1989); The Crisis of Private Law is Not an Ideal Situation, 10 CARDozo L. REv.
1001(1989).
7. This essay is written about the social vision of a working majority of the Supreme Court.
The Majority includes a coalition that shifts over time particularly as some members leave and are
replaced. In its doctrinal developments there are stutters and stops, inconsistent decisions, failed
trials, precedents left in name only, and so forth. See, e.g., Stephen E. Gottlieb, Three Justices in
Search of a Character: The Moral Agendas of Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy, 49
RUrGERs L. REv. 219 (1996) (atteipting to define legal agendas). The social vision being
constructed into the meaning of the Constitution will be over-stated here because of the historical
process of its production and will present details others may easily refute or deny. The entirety of
the argument may be held by no single Justice, perhaps all the better to do its collective job,
drawing attention only to particular doctrines or judicial practices. I will not apologize for this
inevitability. The overriding need is to make this agenda visible through tracings of sporadic and
opportunistic cases and controversies. What is being documented in this general mapping is more
than an ideology false to instrumental objectives of the Court, or false to the understanding of the
actual State at any given point. Nor is this Court different in its form of practices, however
shoddy. It is not un-interested in the delays caused by genuine craft. Rather, it is the inhumanity
of this Court's political practice which demands exposure and political priority. This social vision
is part of the social construction of power itself. This power helps construct a truly vicious set of
social conditions favorable to existing privilege and pretends no responsibility for the human
misery these conditions generate for millions. It is past time for all who believe in democracy to
take a stand.
8. For the conceptual consequences of an antinomy - apparently opposed propositions, yet
necessarily implying each other - in legal theory, see generally ROBERTO UNGER, KNOWLEDGE
AND POLmCS (1975).
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ical economy---the Empty State and Nobody's Market-will be
revealed constructed against the factual contexts that led people claim-
ing rights to the judicial forum to pursue their struggle against oppres-
sion. Section III links this systematic construction of social power and
the subordination it makes possible under law to the gutting of civil and
constitutional rights most important to an authentic democracy. This
gutting has culminated in the virtual overthrow of Brown v. Board of
Education.9 In section IV, an alternative account of the State in the dis-
tribution of power and rights to institutions and individuals will be out-
lined. This final section demonstrates the intentional ideological nature
of the choices planned by the current Justices for us and for our children.
A. The Rehnquist Court Agenda
Ostensibly, the main goal of the Rehnquist Court has been to
uphold democratically-directed bureaucratic regulation of individuals by
denying judicial enforcement of individual rights. Whenever possible,
the Court has transferred authority from national politics to municipal
control of governmental services that deal with or ignore social conflict.
The Court continually waves the flag of federalism and appropriates the
mantle of Brandeisian experimentation, but it does no more than wave.
There are no paeans to state legislatures in these decisions. In fact, often
the opposite is true.' During the same period, not surprisingly, the only
significant areas of individual rights that have been protected are prop-
erty rights of exclusion and First Amendment protection of consumption
for commercially available information."
In reality, the past twenty years of the Court's business has been a
more focused but unannounced systematic dismantling of the decision,
legal reasoning, and social assumptions of Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion.'2 The Court has so thoroughly manipulated the technical doctrines
of Constitutional Rights litigation, that, taken together, these develop-
ments can be explained only as a judicial war against the Civil Rights
Movement. While the veneer of this transformation has been Federal-
ism, and the main mechanisms of change have been doctrines affecting
the litigation of rights, backed by fraudulent concern over judicial legiti-
macy, the driving ideas of this change in the relation of the State to the
organization of social relations has been the Constitutional installation
of a specific political economy. As a result, anti-discrimination rights
9. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
10. Cf Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. Ct. 899 (1996) (attacking North Carolina's conformance with
the U.S. Voting Rights Act rather than attacking the statute of the U.S. Attorney General).
11. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (on property
rights); Austin, supra note 5 (on Commercial Speech.)
12. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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under the Constitution and federal statutes have been magically detached
from economic development especially on grounds of race and gender.'3
At the same time, a particular set of legal relations allocating racial and
gender power seemingly naturally reduce the power of government to
overcome racial and gender injustices. In this manner, an ideology of
the production of power and the legal/political deployment of power
reflect and shape the material conditions and social experiences of
power in a system of production.14
The general consequence of this attack insulates increasingly
walled, suburban, white, and largely wealthy local communities from
any political forum that includes the mass of the population 5 and virtu-
ally all minorities who reside in our large urban cities. 6 These popula-
tions historically sought political power through Congress and
enforcement of individual rights against wholesale exclusions from
power through the federal courts. Now they are to be abandoned as an
underclass, maintained as a continuous low wage labor pool to increase
13. It is an audacious intellectual move to separate the intertwining of racial domination and
economic development in American history. Slavery is recognized in the Constitution. In Dred
Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856), Justice Roger Taney defends property in another human
being as necessarily controlled by state law rather than federal jurisdiction precisely because the
states of the South could never have ceded power to a union to displace the structural basis of its
agrarian economy and the hopes of its citizen's economic territorial expansion. After the civil
war, Jim Crow laws permitted a long extension of the economic practices of slavery as the
continued basis of agriculture in the South. Waves of immigration from the South to work the
North for industrial jobs, especially from the 1920s forward, created racial competition for jobs
with immigrants from other countries. This resulted in a partial contribution to divisions within
the American working class, preventing a stronger political presence-the "American
exceptionalism" of no Labor Party. Economic domination through race most obviously focused
on African-Americans descended from slavery, but other racial minorities were also imported to
build American infrastructure in hazardous circumstances. Indeed, immigration of many races as
legal and illegal "guest workers" has crucially subsidized particular agricultural, light industry,
and manufacturing sectors of the economy. Racial discrimination has traditionally marked
immigrants as a group for which limited economic opportunity and mobility made them available
for domestic and other services, freeing dominant economic groups from tasks which deflected
attention to personal capital accumulation. All of these developments followed the appropriation
of vast lands and resources from Native-Americans.
14. Martha R. Mahoney, The Anti-Transformation Cases: Whiteness, Class and Interest
(manuscript on file with author.)
15. See Martha R. Mahoney, Segregation, Whiteness, and Transformation, 143 U. PA. L.
REv. 1659 (1995) (Symposium: Shaping American Communities: Segregation, Housing & The
Urban Poor); see also, David J. Kennedy, Residential Associations as State Actors: Regulating the
Impact of Gated Communities on Nonmembers, 105 YALE L.J. 761, 767 (1995).
16. Between 1970 and the present virtually all of the largest cities in the nation shifted from a
majority white population to a majority racial minority population. See generally ROBERT A.
BEAUREGARD, VoicEs OF DECLINE: THE POSTWAR FATE OF U.S. CITIES (1993). Coincidentally,
the Supreme Court in 1996 rejected challenges to the census by claiming that the method of
counting used in urban areas substantially undercounted actual populations (this decision
potentially reduced Federal aid to Cities by billions of dollars annually). See Wisconsin v. City of
New York, 517 U.S.1 (1996).
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propertied wealth.1 7
The liberty served by Rehnquist's Court is the liberty of exclusion
from voluntary propertied relations and geography. The Supreme Court
thus abandons enforcing rights that embody the "liberty of inclusion in
fair political processes" rationale that underlies the post-depression
understanding of the Constitution, formulated in footnote four of United
States v. Carolene Products Co.,18 and exemplified by the Brown deci-
sion. Rewriting Brown to get rid of Court responsibility to end invidious
subordination of current minorities by turning Brown into a demand for
"colorblindness" freezes existing majority race use of law to preserve
the majority's gains and exclusivity of geographical location. Conve-
niently, this preserves the white majority's gains against their coming
twenty-first century minority status in the larger, more diverse polity
that is to come.
The construction of the new version of a constitutional system of
social power is deeply defended and multiply masked. First, it is doctri-
nally masked in the name of individual mobility among diverse enclaves
protected by legal gate keepers. Second, it is institutionally masked in
the name of "judicial restraint." The inter-connection of race, gender,
and other subordination to economic development within the legal con-
ceptualization of power will require two things: (1) a mapping of the
political content of judicial decisions that permit government to wash its
hands of responsibility for historical or social domination and (2) the
tying of this political constitution to a particular form of economic
organization. 9
17. See generally WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED--THE INNER Cry,
THE UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1987).
18. 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) (internal citations omitted):
There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality
when legislation appears on its face to be within a cpecific prohibition of the
Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments, which are deemed equally
specific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth....
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those political
processes [such as voting, expression, and political association] which can
ordinarily be expected to bring abut repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be
subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the
Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of legislation....
Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the review of statutes
directed at particular religious, [or] national, [or] racial minorities[;] whether
prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which
tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be
relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more
searching judicial inquiry.
19. In choosing binding interpretation of Constitutional text, statutes, and past doctrine,
judges are a part of the social and cultural construction of identities. That is, however, not the
point of this essay, which focuses on the judicial role in the construction of social force, rather
[Vol. 54:247
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II. PRODUCING THE EMPTY STATE IN NOBODY'S MARKET
A. The Empty State
The decisions of the Rehnquist Court, taken together, reflect a con-
sistent vision of the State that rests on a formal rationalization of rela-
tions of the public and private spheres. Landmark cases defining the
shape of the new State include well-known DeShaney,2 ° Flagg Bros.,2"
Croson,22 Rizzo, 23 Warth,24 and Shaw.25  Also included are the lesser
known cases such as Collins v. Harker Heights26. All define a State that
is identified only by the position of government actors within a political-
economy; therefore, they substantially fail to account for the power
expressed in law itself. This Empty State becomes the interpretive fig-
ure of Constitutional powers during the attack on the Civil Rights move-
ment and its legal successes.
The Empty State presupposes a sharp separation of public and pri-
vate responsibility. This is true although its proponents deny this possi-
bility27 and even as the Rehnquist majority purports to hold that all
property consists of legally permitted bundles of resource uses.28 This is
thus not a return to the strong State separation of central and local func-
tions defined by the regime of a "dual sovereignty" in the nineteenth
century and built on the exhaustion of liberty as liberty of voluntary
than the power of constructions of cultural identities such as Race and Gender. The essay
specifically touches only briefly the burgeoning literature of the Race-Crit, Lat-Crit, and Fem-Crit
movements, which are a complementary and necessary part of the political critique of the present
Supreme Court, but of which this essay's component makes their task that much harder and
which allows the Court to flank identity arguments by the pardon of class and the market. On the
constructions of race, see Mahoney, supra note 14; KIMBERLE CRENSHAW ET AL., CRITICAL RACE
THEORY (1995); D. Marvin Jones, Darkness made Visible: Law, Metaphor, and the Racial Self 82
GEO. L.J. 837 (1993). On gender, see MARTHA A. FINEMAN & NANCY THOMADSEN, AT THE
BOUNDARIES OF LAW: FEMINISM AND LEGAL THEORY (1991). On Lat Crit, see Frank Valdes,
Latinola Ethnicity, Critical Race Theory, and Post-Identity Politics: A Review of Practices and
Possibilities, 9 LA RAZA L.J. 1 (1996). Here, as in the remainder of the notes, citations to the
literature of related topics will not attempt to be exhaustive. In keeping with the essay format,
citations are to examples from which the interested reader may direct themselves. Further, little
attempt will be made to texture generalizations about groups, despite a recognition that not all
members of groups so designated fit the categories, experiences, beliefs, etc. Too often
particularity obscures connections. More strategically, this essay means to document a system of
power which by its constructors' formalism could not care less about such nuance.
20. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Soc. Serv., 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
21. Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
22. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
23. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
24. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
25. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
26. Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U. S. 115 (1992).
27. See Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978) (opinion by Rehnquist, J.,). Kaiser
Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 178-80 (1979) (opinion by Rhenquist, J.).
28. Kaiser, 44 U.S. at 178-80.
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contract. 29 Rather, the Empty State is a new legal construction that
denies public accountability for subordination-the focus of much of
the civil rights movement-and simultaneously protects the current dis-
tribution of wealth and market leverage as just or natural.
In the Empty State, public power is exhaustively exercised by
agents of governmental institutions. Only direct acts of governmental
officials acting intentionally are considered state action. Background
rules of law are not state action because the rules merely enable an
intentional private actor. Private power is exercised as the pure aggre-
gate of individual resource allocation. Public power is political. Private
power is legal.
This is not the old public-private distinction or the old distinction
between politics and adjudicated law. This new vision is driven by a
view of the State and not by a view of a pre-existing private sphere of
natural property relations.3" This is a view of the twentieth century
modern State.3' All power is socially constructed and therefore regu-
lated by ordering or governing institutions. The Empty State thus pre-
supposes a Private-Public unity in which each side blends into an aspect
of the other even as the division is defined formalistically as bounded by
a sharp, fixed line.32
The public-private distinction has therefore become an archaic label
for a constantly redistributive continuum of contested public legitimacy.
When constitutional liberty is merely freedom from arbitrary or invidi-
29. See National League of Cities v. Usury, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., plurality
opinion) (rejecting the system of pure "dual sovereignty").
30. See JOHN KEANE, CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE STATE (1988). John Keane describes the
ideology of privatization of the State generally:
A selective withdrawal of state power from civil society and the gradual renewal of
private competition and market ethics are envisaged. The state, in this view, should
be biased more openly in favour of commodity production and exchange. Neo-
conservatives do not normally call for limitations of the power of the state. State
power is seen to be essential as a forum for determining and administering the rules
of market competition, as well as for filling its gaps and limiting its malfunctions.
Thus, the main task is to render it more effective and legitimate by limiting its role
as a provider of goods and services to civil society in favour of its role as the
authoritative guardian of civil society. The state must become both more powerful
and more limited in scope.
Keane, at 10-11. Compare Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
31. "Because of the institutional differentiation between political and economic functions,
state and society mutually depend on each other. The administrative state depends on taxes, while
the market economy relies on legal guarantees, political regulations, and infrastructural
provisions." Jurgen Habermas, The European Nation State: Its Achievements and its Limitations:
On the Past and Future of Sovereignty and Citizenship, 9 RATIO JURIS 125, 126 (1996).
32. United States v. Virginia, 581 U.S. 515 (1996) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (demonstrating State interest in the diversity of higher education by Virginia's full
support of the all male VMI and its partial support of all female private colleges).
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ous political wrong-negative liberty 33-all the decisional focus is on
the limits of governmental responsibility for an individual's diminished
choice. Under the Madisonian theory of separation of powers, no matter
which institution or interpretive method prevails, the scope of rights
must in substantive content and methodology match the other side of a
line setting the limits of legitimately exercised, limited, enumerated
political powers of majoritarian governance. 34 Yet under contemporary
empirical experience, there is not and cannot be a fixed private sphere of
rights that simultaneously deserve protection and marks the substantive
limits of enumerated powers. Private power is then the residue of the
plenary public regulation of market interdependence and nuisance,
rather than an individualistic and pre-existing or natural distribution of
property generating interests that contract politically for common protec-
tion and public coordination.
The new argument continues, and some say that surely government
cannot be liable for every person's power simply because power is only
what the government is willing to enforce. Some kind of distinction
must be drawn, no longer to protect individual right, but to limit public
responsibility. Purely negative constitutional rights designed to prevent
excess by direct governing officials, combined with the need to limit the
scope of governmental responsibility, allow the courts to fashion a fic-
tional public-private distinction in legal doctrine where power is
divorced from legally accountable government responsibility for its
use.
35
Legal enforcement of legal permissions and patterns and practices
of governmental policies are not State action.36 Note carefully that law
as general policy (such as the Uniform Commercial Code) is not State
action unless a government official directly carries out the policy pro-
ducing the direct consequences to a complaining person. More and
more governance is carried out by delegation to private institutions, by
subsidy, by tax incentive or disincentive, by private enforcement, by the
nod and the wink, or by intentional inaction. All such law is not State or
government action subject to the responsibilities of Constitutional rights
or enforceable limits. Unless a government official is inextricably nec-
33. See ISIAH BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY (1969). On the difference between negative
and positive liberty, see generally Charles Taylor, What's Wrong With Negative Liberty, in THE
IDEA OF FREEDOM, 175 (A. Ryan ed. 1979).
34. This recognition renders most of the voluminous critique of limited deference of the Court
in setting federalism limits in U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 548 (1995), irrelevant once the Court has
begun to use minimum rationality with bite to decide individual rights in cases such as Cleburne v.
Cleburne Mental Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 442 (1985), a decision most of the same
commentators applaud.
35. See generally Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
36. See generally Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
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essary to the fulfillment of the consequences of law, there is no State.
Only private individuals exist. The Private sector did it, and so did the
market. But who is the market?
B. Nobody's Market
In the cartoons, when the parent asks the innocent child, "Who
broke the vase?; Who let the dog out?; Who took the cookies?," the
child's response is, "Nobody did it." Sure enough, in the background
the barely invisible gremlin is seen. He is the "Nobody," snickering
away.
Just as the State is empty, so the Market, which belongs to and is
comprised of Nobody. Presupposing the Empty State and Nobody's
Market to be manifestations of each other distributes power in a particu-
lar way. The State distributes power as an option to accept or reject
personal responsibility for the social risks associated with production,
both economic and cultural. Market actors, who have little access to
productive capital of their own, face market pressure to accept a low
market value for social risks supposedly compensated by their private
wages. Thus, citizens with fewer personal resources end up in the worst
position along with those who suffer high costs of work participation.
Both categories often describe women and minorities, and especially
minority women.37
Why would a constitutional system that systematically insulates
power from accountable responsibility for its delegation and deployment
represent an acceptable vision of social organization? The answer lies
within a powerful conception of political economy that overrides com-
peting understandings of the contents of rights. In general, the Rehn-
quist Court follows an "American Fallacy"38 that the State is no more
than co-extensive with the Government and that the Government con-
sists of no more than constitutionally described institutions.39 The
American Fallacy enables the present Court's articulated assumption
that government power is limited to the purely direct, intentional results
of government officials."n This observation demonstrates how fallacies
37. For a discussion of the new welfare law, see Martha Mahoney Domestic Violence and
Welfare Reform (on file with the author).
38. The use of the term "American Fallacy" in this context, as well as the terms "Empty
State" and "Nobody's Market" are the invention of the author. For an entire symposium
thoroughly captured within this American Fallacy, see generally Symposium, Changing Images of
the State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1179-1400 (1994).
39. See, e.g., Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 366 (1976) (capitalizing Government instead of
State and using lowercase to label specific government functions).
40. For elaboration of the fallacy of any contemporary attempt to separate the State and
Capitalist markets, see generally Habermas, supra note 31.
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are often tools of power.
A more realistic understanding of the State encompasses the totality
of power deployed as legitimate because of the law within a community.
The State is not empty of distributions of power to specific interests any
more than market practices are ordained by faceless fuzzy spirits.
C. Case Struggle
The interdependence of the supposedly opposed decisionmaking of
the Empty State and Nobody's Market is made to seem natural in several
constitutional responsibility cases that involve workers and their
problems. In this section's first part, struggles over constitutional rights
in relation to claims about class and race follow the same reasoning,
regardless of the identity of the parties. In some cases, the reasoning
upholds the denial of public responsibilities, while in others, government
actors are restrained on the basis of race from living up to admitted
responsibility to make voting and government expenditures more demo-
cratic. Taken together, these cases show how law restricts claims that
the state is not empty of racism when it uses market intermediaries of
power holders. In the second part, cases involving gender and women's
interests in labor force participation demonstrate deflection of their sta-
tus claims into worker's claims under which the law is color and gender
blind. They show how Nobody's market excuses gender discrimination
by excusing liability to workers as a just market practice that is backed
by neutral legal enforcement.
1. RACISM AND NOBODY'S MARKET
Classically, in a unanimous 1992 decision, the Court in Collins v.
City of Harker Heights, Texas41 made the link between the Empty State
and Nobody's Market explicit. Larry Collins, an employee in the city
sanitation department, died of asphyxia trying to repair an underground
sewer line into which he had been ordered.4 2 The city-employer never
warned him of the dangers of sewer gas, had no safety monitoring
equipment, did not require employees to use the minimal and insuffi-
cient equipment it had, and never trained its employees in the safety
procedures they should use if they ever encountered hazards.43 The city
did not implement any of these preventative measures, even though six
weeks earlier Collin's supervisor had been rendered unconscious in sim-
ilar circumstances and even though the city was required to do these
41. 503 U.S. 115 (1992).
42. Collins v. City of Harker Heights, Texas, 503 U.S. at 117.
43. Id.
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things by Texas statute.44 Harker Heights did not contest the facts other
than to insist that, despite the fact that repairing clogged sewer lines was
part of Collin's job description, Collins entered the sewer voluntarily.
According to the Supreme Court, the plaintiff stated no constitu-
tional because, even assuming the city demonstrated "deliberate indiffer-
ence" toward Collins, there was no abuse of government power (a wrong
protected against by an enforceable right).45 The city as government
could not be under an affirmative constitutional duty to take any action,
given the definitions of rights as negative liberty.46 No governmental
official physically forced Collins down the manhole or released the gas.
The policy of the Empty State was simply inaction in the face of danger.
Why wasn't the work order enough force in itself? Did Harker Heights
act reasonably to protect an individual from the foreseeable conse-
quences of its no training policy?
According to the court's reasoning, the city did not have to act at all
because taking the job on the terms offered was the responsibility of the
employee.47 Clarence Thomas' first question from the Supreme Court
bench was, "Would it change your analysis if Mr. Collins were a city
prisoner required to clear the sewers? '48  Harker Heights' attorney
agreed that "it would be different if the dead man had been forced to
enter the sewer, rather than entering it as part of his job.""9 Collins did
not need to take the job. He could have quit and refused the order at the
time. If there was any economic compulsion to take a hazardous job that
was the responsibility of Nobody's Market. The city as employer only
made the offer, which included the "bitter with the sweet,"5 presumably
because the accepted wage contained a market valuation of the hazard
sufficient to compensate the employee to train himself or buy insurance.
The Court's reasoning was underlined by the assumption that if compen-
sation was insufficient, it was irrational on Collin's part to accept the
job.5'
The lower federal courts make clear, following Collins, that the
new Constitutional law relies on Nobody's Market. Bobby Llewellyn
44. Id. at 118, n.1. See Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann., art. 5182b (West 1987) (Texas Hazard
Communication Act, replaced by Acts 1989, 71st Leg., ch. 678, § 13(1), ef. Sept. 1, 1989,
enacting the Health and Safety Code, which constituted part of the continuation of the Texas
Legislative Council's statutory revision program. The Texas Hazard Communication Act is
currently codified under Tex. Health and Safety Code Ann. §§ 502 (West Supp. 1999)).
45. Id. at 119-20.
46. See id. at 126.
47. See id. at 128.
48. Collins v. Harker Heights, Report of Oral Arg., U.S. Law Week (B.N.A. 1992).
49. Collins v. Harker Heights, Report of Oral Arg., supra note 48.
50. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 154 (1974).
51. See Collins, 503 U.S. at 128-29.
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lost an arm and a foot when a metal bar touched a live power line while
working on the roof construction of a school less than six feet from the
live line.52 The school board knew of the danger and it knew the line
must be moved under state law.53 After debate, it decided to leave the
line to the contractor to save the $600 removal fee.54 Overturning the
District Court's denial of summary judgment, the Sixth Circuit saw only
gross negligence covered by state tort law, and thus not a deprivation of
any constitutionally protected interest:
It is true that defendants acted intentionally in delaying the planned
move of the power line, but the Harker Heights defendants acted
intentionally in sending Collins down the manhole without warning
him of the known hazard from sewer gas and without providing him
proper safety equipment. If the defendants in the present case were
guilty of "deliberate indifference" to "unreasonable risks of harm,"
moreover, that was assumed to be the case in Harker Heights as well.
What the defendants did not do was engage in arbitrary conduct
intentionally designed to punish someone.5
It was not arbitrary to save money in the market. The decision
represented only an intention to use the market, which can never be
arbitrary.
On March 7, 1990 at 8:30 am. Metz John Searles died along with a
number of others when a SEPTA (Southeastern Pennsylvania Transpor-
tation Authority) commuter train derailed and crashed due to a missing
nut and improper installation on one of the wheel trucks.56 Among other
actions, SEPTA failed to perform required inspections, kept records cov-
ering up the failures, forced trains back to service without maintenance,
had no engineering diagrams or instructions for installation and mainte-
nance, and installed the part on contrary to manufacturer's instruc-
tions.57 Of course, public transportation is one of the only ways that
poorer workers can get to work sites, often publicly defined and remote
from low income housing. The Market-Frankfort line was the only pub-
lic system available in Searles' area. The Third Circuit found that the
riders voluntarily chose to ride the El and were therefore governed by
Collins:
failing to ventilate sewer gas is not meaningfully different from fail-
ing to maintain rail cars in a safe operating condition. Thus, in these
52. See Llewllyn v. Metropolitan Gov't of Nashville and Davidson County, Tenn., 34 F.3d
345, 346 (6th Cir. 1994).
53. See id.
54. See id. at 347.
55. Id. at 351.
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cases and in Collins the fundamental cause of the danger was a fail-
ure to act. Neither in these cases nor in Collins was the injury
directly caused by a state actor's affirmative act in the traditional
sense.
58
The Empty State and Nobody's Market are therefore not a return to
Lochner libertarianism-there is no privity between riders and mechan-
ics. Nor is there any authentic federalism concern in Searles for the
autonomy of state tort law where the managers acted intentionally as
market participants. Rather, in Searles, there simply was no State.
The Empty State/Nobody's Market image also influences other jus-
tices who usually are opposed to Rehnquist. Justice Breyer delivered a
bare majority opinion in a Section 1983 private prison guard case in the
last week of the 1996-97 term. In Richardson v. McKnight,59 a prisoner
sued the operator of a private prison because a guard had inflicted inju-
ries upon him through excessive force. The core Justices under Justice
Scalia wanted to find Section 1983 inapplicable by claiming that the
same qualified immunities applied to traditionally purely public func-
tions that are privatized as to those still run by the state.6" To the con-
trary, the Majority's Justice Breyer first demonstrated that prisons had
been run privately and publicly in no particular pattern since their intro-
duction in this country.61 Justice Breyer then examined the functional
need or lack of need for immunity in the private setting by noting such
immunities had not been created under state law.62 For Justice Breyer,
there was no question Section 1983 applied to the private prison guards
because, while they were not governmental officials, they were acting
under color of State law.63 However, they were not in need of immunity
because the market would lead private prison owners to avoid liability
costs by shifting them to the employee!
In other words, marketplace pressures provide the private firm
with strong incentives to avoid overly timid, insufficiently vigorous,
unduly fearful, or "non-arduous" employee job performance. The
contract's provisions - including those that might permit employee
indemnification and avoid many civil-service restrictions - grant this
private firm freedom to respond to those market pressures through
rewards and penalties that operate directly upon its employees. To
this extent, the employees before us resemble those of other private
firms and differ from government employees. 64
58. Id. at 793.
59. 521 U.S. 399 (1997).
60. See Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 414 (1997) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
61. See id. at 403-04.
62. See id. at 404-05.
63. See id. at 408-410.
64. Id. at 410 (citation omitted).
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There is question that there is State liability in these cases, but
Nobody's Market as the State's agency not only makes State immunity
inapplicable, but it also transfers the cost of market risk to the less pow-
erful bargaining agent, the now private employee.65
Even the construction of the State itself represents the same case.
Consider Shaw v. Reno66 as a labor case rather than as a voting rights
case. In the State's decision to increase minority representation in Con-
gress from one to two representatives from North Carolina, the Court
saw only an unconstitutional use of race to define the fish hook shape of
the second district, at times no wider than the interstate itself.67 The
Court never investigated the responsibility of the State in building 1-80,
with its exits serving the construction of textile and furniture mills in
formerly farming communities, employing non-union, low wage Afri-
can-Americans as their best opportunities available for work, and thus,
the geographic concentration of minorities capturable for representation
purposes in no other way. African-American workers formed the labor
markets for the industrial jobs that the state infrastructure served, jobs
which largely moved from newly unionized companies fleeing New
England in the 1920s to the legal right to work states of the Southern
Piedmont. Justice O'Connor could not see the competitive state's poli-
cies in capturing somebody else's product and labor markets. On
remand, the District Court in an extraordinary and lengthy factual opin-
ion,68 demonstrated the economic homogeneity of the district as a factor
other than race to explain the state legislature's redistricting and its
simultaneous attempt to meet its responsibilities under the Voting Rights
Act.
69
65. Compare U.S. v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 861-71 (1997). In Winstar Corp., specific
governmental officials of the Resolution Trust Corporation and the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board, charged with regulating the savings and loan industry, ultra vires promised S and L's in
trouble a favorable form of accounting practice in exchange for participation in the government
program. When Congress subsequently prohibited this accounting windfall, the fractured Court
found a quasi-estoppel, sort of Takings bar to the legislation's application in spite of the usual
doctrinal rule that property holders in the modem era hold even the benefits of contracts subject to
their own insurable risk that general regulatory rules may change and therefore change the value
of specific contract terms without constitutional implications. For workers, lack of insurance for
risk is their fault, but not for banks.
Additionally, the construction of communities based on property, through incoherent
limitations on public policies over land use under the Takings clause simply represents a form of
majoritarian exclusion from liberty interests of non-propertied citizens. That which can not be
done legislatively can be insulated from any power but that of the market.
66. 509 U.S. 630 (1993). For the strongest criticism of the case on grounds of race, see Leon
Higgenbotham et. al, Shaw v. Reno: A Mirage of Good Intentions, 62 FORD. L. REv. 1593 (1994).
67. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. at 644-45.
68. Shaw v. Hunt, 861 F. Supp. 408, 470 (E.D. N.C. 1994), rev'd, 517 U.S. 899 (1996).
69. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L.No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437.
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A similar justification for the districting in Vera v. Richardson7"
was ignored on the ground that there was no proof the legislature relied
upon the admitted material community of interests other than race:
Dr. Paul Geisel, an expert for the state, proclaims that District 30
represents a community of interests that shares "one economy, one
transportation system, one media/communications system and one
higher education system." . . . Dr. Paul Waddell, the United States
land use expert ... attempts to explain the boundaries of District 30
in non-racial land use terms. First, most of its "arms and fingers" of
Congressional District 30 follow both natural and commercial land
use boundaries, including industrial belts, retail areas, the Trinity
River, and freeway corridors.7'
Both demonstrations, however, proved ultimately fruitless when
Justice Rehnquist for the majority on appeal in Shaw v. Hunt,72 assum-
ing such compliance with the Voting Rights Act might constitute a com-
pelling government interest justifying the mere use of race by
government, found that the state nonetheless failed to demonstrate that
the use of race was narrowly tailored to the specific victims of voting
rights deprivations by the state government in the past.
In Hunt, Justice Rehnquist explicitly announced that the govern-
ment can never meet this aspect of the compelling interest test if its
interest is in remedying past social or historical discrimination.73 Mar-
ket development may be subsidized by the State, but that is not govern-
mental action for which remedies can be directed against specific
officials when the intended market incentives lead to community devel-
opment which makes contiguous legislative districting impossible. The
Market actors whose economic interests lead them to seek political ben-
efits have no responsibility in turn for the representativeness of electoral
or districting decisions. 74  They are innocent regarding past overt dis-
70. 861 F. Supp. 1304 (S.D. Tex. 1994), affid sub. nom., Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996).
71. Vera v. Richardson, 861 F.Supp. at 1322-23.
72. 517 U.S. 899 (1996).
73. Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. at 906-07.
74. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 132 (1986). In the last week of the 1996-1997
term, a bare majority extended Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995), in the reverse of the
original case, Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74 (1997). In Abrams, African-American voters
challenged the District Court's redistricting of Georgia's congressional delegation struck down in
Miller, (where white voters had challenged the redistricting) and after the Georgia State
Legislature deadlocked on a replacement plan which would comply with the Voting Rights Act.
The District Court "without clear error" returned to the 1980 and 1970 census based districts in
creating only the same one majority-minority district as present then, on the ground that no other
compact such district was feasible. The dissent showed that a plan not considered by the
legislature did provide a second district, but that plan divided some counties. The intent of the
legislature was not relevant because the legislature intended to comply with the U.S. Justice
Department's insistence on a maxi-Black three districts struck down in Miller because it explicitly
used race as the dominant consideration in the districting. That is, an intent to comply with the
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crimination in elections and cannot be penalized, whatever their racial
voting block."
Much of the Court's new reasoning stems from City of Richmond v.
J.A. Croson Co.,76 a case involving a white general contractor's chal-
lenge to the constitutionality of a city ordinance requiring all prime con-
tractors awarded construction contracts by the city to set aside at least
statutorily defined administration of the federal Voting Rights Act, although struck down in one
particular instance, prevents subsequent attempt at compliance with the law in another different
plan. The question begged in Shaw v. Reno and Shaw v. Hunt seems to be answered sub-silentio.
The Voting Rights Act, one of the core gains of the civil rights movement, attempting to remove
and remedy State imposed racial barriers to democracy, has not been overruled. The Act just can
not be administered constitutionally because it is based on the explicit demand for change in the
results of the traditional Georgia race-based drawing of all its political jurisdictions, including
congressional seats.
One week later, a different bare majority in Lawyer v. Department of Justice, 521 U.S. 567
(1997) upheld a misshapen Florida congressional district with only a thirty-six percent Black
population, id. at 581, apparently because it resulted from a settlement reached between African-
American and some white litigants brokered through state legislators acting in an unofficial
capacity and not considered or directed by the Florida legislature itself! Apparently, the intrusion
of the politicians made the case acceptable as a political gerrymander like Davis v. Bandemer,
even though Lawyer's result split the city of Tampa into different districts to accomplish a racially
marked districting.
75. On the separate question of standing in the case, John Hart Ely argues quite correctly,
contrary to Supreme Court doctrine, that the issue of injury alleged as a basis for standing is not
defined by the same use of injury proven to determine whether unconstitutional use of race has
been used in majority-minority representation of otherwise majority race plaintiffs. John Hart Ely,
Standing to Challenge Pro-Minority Gerrymanders (on file with author). He finds the side
switching between liberals and conservatives on the voting rights standing issue to be much ado
about a relatively easy conclusion, certainly as compared to the merits of the claim. The "liberal"
use of the Empty State argument that no standing exists because no official deprives the white
voter of actually voting, which is after all guaranteed, fails to accord the white voter the protection
against the same use of race that is the necessary predicate for the benign motive in re-districting.
He finds the search for a racial harm the government caused by the conservatives to avoid their
own petard, tortured, perhaps because more is at stake. There is another, more important, game
afoot. Reflecting politically neutral, individual market/consumption preferences with their party-
line votes for political gerrymandering is substantively constitutional because the market,
belonging to Nobody, is not caused to choose any particular response to government policy.
Because there is no government causality possible in simply living with the status quo, a parallel
no standing argument in the case is literally inconceivable. See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109,
127-134. However, any use of race to redirect or reform the supposed lack of connection between
government officials and innocent private individual's necessary choices on source of housing, or
job, or school, is intended to change things. Of course all changes to overcome injustices
perpetuated in the present now contain the possible harm to an individual that the program will
actually be effective. The Court's construct obviously is a self-fulfilling prophecy. Keeping the
merits of discrimination the same as the standing question, "What victimization of specific
individuals has been directly caused by specific officials?" deflects us from examining the
subordinating effects of generally intended and foreseen actions, also formerly relevant and
known as invidiousness, in order to test the constitutionality of the attempt to voluntarily
overcome the reality of racial voting and racial patronage. The Standing game is a judicially
rigged game of the same cloth as the legislatively rigged game that Carolene Products targeted for
judicial control. For further explanation, see section I, infra.
76. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
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thirty percent of the contract's dollar amount for minority-owned busi-
nesses.77 From the Supreme Court's perspective, the reason for granting
certiorari involved the need to reconcile two past cases: 78 Fullilove v.
Klutznick,79 under which federal courts deferred to congressional find-
ings and remedies of past social discrimination by race in federal con-
struction contracts, and Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, ° which
mandated stricter scrutiny of intentional discrimination caused by gov-
ernment officials of state and local governments as a predicate to relief
of the effects of past discrimination using racial quotas.
In J.A. Croson,8 1 the Court reasoned that it did not matter that pri-
vate economic discrimination may have been made effective in the past
by virtue of economic and political position achieved by the totality of
incentives structured by government involvement in social relations gen-
erally, or in distributing public building contracts in the past to solely
white contractors, specifically. The Court held that a new African-
American city council cannot set aside specific funds for minority con-
tractors (30%) just because they gained a bare political majority and are
now in position to partially reverse the past white councils' distribution
of 99.33% of building contracts to white contractors over the previous
five years.82 To avoid racially motivated political redistribution, the set
aside must go to specific past victims of only a governmental official's
racially motivated denial of past contracts.8 3
The Empty State did nothing to present Black contractors. The
Empty State just funded the lowest past bidder, who just turned out to be
more efficient in Nobody's Market, which just happened to be the con-
tractors who always received the Empty State's patronage and who just
happened to be white. Government actors, by relying on the competitive
bidding of the market, did not victimize the Black contractors of
Richmond.84
77. Id. at 477-84.
78. Id. at 477, 484-89.
79. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1989).
80. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
81. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, Co. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
82. See id. at 480.
83. See id. at 483-5.
84. The J.A. Croson, Co. Court could not reach unanimous agreement, and in fact filed six
opinions. "O'CONNOR, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the
Court with respect to Parts I, III-B, and IV, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and WHITE, STEVENS,
and KENNEDY, JJ., joined, an opinion with respect to Part II, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and
WHITE, J., joined, and an opinion with respect to Parts III-A and V, in which REHNQUIST, C.J.,
and WHITE and KENNEDY, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., and KENNEDY, J., filed opinions
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment (2) and (3). SCALIA, J., filed an opinion
concurring in the judgment (4). MARSHALL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN
and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined (5). BLACKMUN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which
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Justice O'Connor's formal equality rests on an accompanying view
of human nature that citizens are equally independent and self-inter-
ested. Whether such independent individuals are equally empowered by
condition and context, or indeed whether existing capacities to compete
seem important to those who make choices within given historical cir-
cumstances, becomes a subordinated, because assumed, part of the doc-
trinal discourse.8 5  Justice O'Connor treats this assumed independent
human nature, and the corollaries for social justice comfortable to it, as
neutral and not in need of examination when translated into standards of
judicial review of conduct.86 What is offered in the one hand - a predi-
cate of wrong to an enforceable notion of equality - is taken back by the
other hand - a strict scrutiny of any form of passive or active racial intent
in the chosen remedy.87 Yet, for Justice O'Connor the connection of
BRENNAN, J., joined (6)." Justice O'Connor left no doubt that the stakes in deciding the form of
judicial review of government action under equal protection analysis inhered in the relation of law
to social justice:
To accept Richmond's claim that past societal discrimination alone can serve as the
basis for rigid racial preferences would be to open the door to competing claims for
"remedial relief' for every disadvantaged group. The dream of a Nation of equal
citizens in a society where race is irrelevant to personal opportunity and
achievement would be lost in a mosaic of shifting preferences based on inherently
unmeasurable claims of past wrongs.... We think such a result would be contrary
to both the letter and spirit of a constitutional provision whose central command is
equality.
Id. at 505-06.
85. See Mahoney, supra note 15, at 36.
86. O'Connor explains:
As this Court has noted in the past, the "rights created by the first section of the
Fourteenth Amendment are, by its terms, guaranteed to the individual. The rights
established are personal rights."... To whatever racial group these citizens belong,
their "personal rights" to be treated with equal dignity and respect are implicated by
a rigid rule erecting races as the sole criterion in an aspect of public decision
making.
Absent searching judicial inquiry into the justification for such race-based measures,
there is simply no way of determining what classifications are "benign" or
"remedial" and what classifications are in fact motivated by illegitimate notions of
racial inferiority or simple racial politics.
J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 (quoting Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948)).
87. Further, the logic of exclusion embodied in Justice O'Connor's reasoning is not obvious
from within its own definition of reasonableness. The more subtle exclusion occurs by what is
taken for granted in constructing the terms of the legal dispute. Justice O'Connor defines justice
as equality, positively, on its own terms, in the abstract. Curiously, positive definitions exclude
what they do not affirm, especially when bounded by negative restraints called rights. However,
to establish equality more than abstractly or formally, justice can only be known by a different
negative, that is, by overcoming injustice. Indeed, Justice O'Connor softens the logical rigor of
her assumptions defining intent, provoking two more extreme statements in the concurring
opinions of Justices Kennedy and Scalia, both of whom rely upon an even more abstract notion of
equality as formal opportunity. See J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. at 518-20 (Kennedy, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment), 520-28 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (showing
that equality is satisfied by mere facial governmental color-blindness).
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law, and therefore the state, with social practices of race is one that is
manageable, in fact legally cognizable, only as a matter of the intentions
of public individuals.88 Only by intent are positive, abstract lines
crossed. Thus, Justice O'Connor and the Court in J.A. Croson reason
that since private persons are not responsible for the public, which is
simply derivative of aggregated private interest, the public cannot be
responsible when that same primary private interest is discriminatory on
any grounds.89 It does not matter that the discrimination may have been
Additionally, Kathleen Sullivan argues that the search for doctrinal formality substantially
limits the idea of voluntary remedy of discrimination:
Visiting affirmative duties to integrate only upon past wrongdoers also makes racial
preferences seem more like corrective or retributive justice than like social
engineering. It thus helps to rebut charges that racial balancing has become an end
in itself. If just any employer were free to become an avenging angel, using
affirmative action to right a diffuse and generalized history of racism in society at
large, the racial composition resulting in that employer's workplace might appear
arbitrary. But if the employer discriminated in the past, its extension of preferential
treatment to blacks now can be understood as simply creating a racial balance that
might have existed anyway, but for the discrimination.
Making sins of past discrimination the justification for affirmative action,
however, dooms affirmative action to further challenge even while legitimating it.
True, viewing affirmative action that way saves it from the charge that it aims
only at racially balanced results by making it seem instead a matter of corrective or
retributive justice, compensating for or punishing earlier racial wrongs. But because
corrective justice focuses on victims, and retributive justice on wrongdoers,
predicating affirmative action on past sins of discrimination invites claims that
neither nonvictims should benefit, nor nonsinners pay.
Kathleen Sullivan, Sins of Discrimination: Last Term's Affirmative Action Cases, 100 HARV. L.
REV. 78, 92 (1986).
88. See J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. at 490-91, 498-99, 503-505 (on intent of public officials and
public officials suborning private intent).
89. Justice O'Connor's view of the nonliability of the public for private discrimination may
be compared with the following view expressed by Justice Brennan:
The greatest formality and regularity of government operation is reflected in the
organization form of the modem state: the bureaucracy. Max Weber, one of the
earliest and most insightful analysts of this phenomenon described its characteristic
principle as "the abstract regularity of the exercise of authority," which is prompted
by the desire for "'[equality before the law' and the demand for legal guarantees
against arbitrariness." "The theory of modem public administration," wrote Weber,
"assumes that the authority to order certain matters by decree... does not entitle the
agency to regulate the matter by individual commands given for each case, but only
to regulate the matter abstractly." The bureaucratic model of authority therefore
aspires ultimately to banish passion from government altogether, and to establish a
state where only reason will reign.
.. In its starkest form, the ability of bureaucracy to hide responsibility calls to
mind the words that Hannah Arendt wrote of Adolf Eichmann: "You ... said that
your role in the Final Solution was an accident and that almost anybody could have
taken your place .... What you meant to say was that where all, or almost all, are
guilty, nobody is." If due process values are to be preserved in the bureaucratic
state of the late twentieth century, it may be essential that officials possess
passion-the same passions that puts them in touch with the dreams and
disappointments of those with whom they deal.
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effective by virtue of economic and political position achieved by the
totality of incentives structured by government involvement in social
relations more generally, nor indeed that political and economic domi-
nance extends unbroken from an origin of enforced slavery. It does not
matter because it cannot matter that personal conduct and power have
mere legal authorization. In short, the ideology of the Empty State, 90 the
state empty of all but the decisions of its agents, renders social discrimi-
nation without more, beyond the boundaries of legal concern.9'
Even if it is assumed that politics cannot infect law, law does not
necessarily limit the openness of politics. Formal access to political
decisionmaking is not access to the resources that make participation
meaningful. For those from the outside who have watched Tammany
Hall patronage politics provide all but .67% of Richmond's construction
to white contractors over five years,92 it might seem curious that the very
success of the black majority of the city in gaining a bare majority on the
city commission should make it harder to obtain a fairer distribution of
William Brennan, Reason, Passion, and "Progress of Law," 10 CARDOZO L. REv. 3, 18, 19
(1988) (footnotes omitted).
90. On the ideology of the empty state, see Kenneth Casebeer, Toward a Critical
Jurisprudence-A First Step by Way of the Public-Private Distinction in Constitutional Law, 37
U. MiAmi L. REv. 379, 412-23 (1983). Gary Peller describes this ideology:
[I]t is necessary to resist the image of social relations as simple products of
individual intent and choice. Rather, we must recognize and articulate the social
and external aspects inherent in so-called private relations. The image of private
social relations and "individual" choice depends on the metaphysic of presence.
"Private" relations are "private" to the extent that they are represented as not
constituted or influenced by "absent" public or social forces; "individual will" is
"individual" to the extent that it is self-present and not dependent on the practices of
others. The metaphysic of privacy and self-presence accordingly denies the politics
of the social construction of the self and the other by finding the origin of the
relation in a source for social practices existing prior to social practices, in a
mythical moment of purity from the public world.
Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CAL. L. REv. 1151, 1178 (1985).
91. What is surprising about Justice O'Connor's opinion is that she recognizes that the
predicate for remedy could be demonstrated by findings of passive involvement of government
officials:
Thus, if the city could show that it had essentially become a "passive participant" in
a system of racial exclusion practiced by elements of the local construction industry,
we think it clear that the city could take affirmative steps to dismantle such a
system. It is beyond dispute that any public entity, state or federal, has a compelling
interest in assuring that public dollars, drawn from the tax contributions of all
citizens, do not serve to finance the evil of private prejudice.
J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. at 492 (O'Connor, J.). Indeed, this passage raised hope among civil rights
activists that law can be used against some past racial discrimination in ways considered doubtful
following Wygant. Justice O'Connor's very attempt to expand government responsibility to the
nod and the wink demonstrates first, that the far limits of liberty's possible content are still hos-
tage to the practicalities of judicial review of intentional conduct, and second, that this need for a
drawable line is to preserve the separation of law from politics, including racial politics.
92. J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. at 479-80.
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the pie.93
In his Croson dissent, Justice Marshall laments the shifting rules of
the game:
In concluding that remedial classifications warrant no different stan-
dard of review under the Constitution than the most brute and repug-
nant forms of state-sponsored racism, a majority of this Court signals
that it regards racial discrimination as largely a phenomenon of the
past, and that government bodies need no longer preoccupy them-
selves with rectifying racial injustice. I, however, do not believe this
Nation is anywhere close to eradicating racial discrimination or its
vestiges.... I am also troubled by the majority's assertion that, even
if it did not believe generally in strict scrutiny of race-based remedial
measures, "the circumstances of this case" require this Court to look
upon the Richmond City Council's measure with the strictest scru-
tiny. The sole such circumstance which the majority cites, however,
is the fact that blacks in Richmond are a "dominant racial grou[p]" in
the city.
.. . In my view, the "circumstances of this case," underscore the
importance of not subjecting to a strict scrutiny straitjacket the
increasing number of cities which have recently come under minority
leadership and are eager to rectify, or at lease prevent the perpetua-
tion of, past racial discrimination. In many cases, these cities will be
the ones with the most in the way of prior discrimination to rectify.
Richmond's leaders had just witnessed decades of publicly sanc-
tioned racial discrimination in virtually all walks of life-discrimina-
tion amply documented in the decisions of the federal judiciary.9 4
Justice O'Connor insists that remedy of past discrimination
requires consistency with equal protection of the laws if it is to be under-
stood as more than racially motivated political redistribution. Under the
ideology of the Empty State,95 what renders the fact of redistribution
"non-neutral" is fault-an intentional act that is either direct-Wygant,
or passive-Croson. Simply to hold government aloof from private
practices enforced by legal rules is not state action. As government
actors have done nothing, the State has done nothing. As there is no
93. Id. at 493-96. Justice Stevens stated however, "There is, of course, another possibility
that should not be overlooked. The ordinance might be nothing more than a form of patronage.
But racial patronage, like a racial gerrymander, is no more defensible than political patronage or a
political gerrymander." Id. at 516 n.7. Justice Stevens side-steps whether past patronage of
whites is racially, politically, or economically motivated; or a combination of all three intentions.
94. Id. at 552-54 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). Justice Marshall noted
Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358 (1975) (denying right to vote based on race); Bradley v.
School Board of Richmond, 462 F.2d 1058 (4th Cir. 1972), affd by an equally divided Court, 412
U.S. 92 (1973) (inadequate compliance with Brown v. Board of Educ. 347 U.S. 483 (1954)
(relating housing discrimination to desegregation of schools).
95. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
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affirmative legal obligation to change social practice, the state has done
nothing except continue the social order. That many of the existing con-
tractors might not have survived to the present without past state support
and state supervision of the marketplace is not the responsibility of the
state until a government official intends to wink for the benefit of the
state.
Justice Marshall counters:
When government channels all its contracting funds to a white-domi-
nated community of established contractors whose racial homogene-
ity is the product of private discrimination, it does more than place its
imprimatur on the practices which forged and which continue to
define that community. It also provides a measurable boost to those
economic entities that have thrived within it, while denying important
economic benefits to those entities which, but for prior discrimina-
tion, might well be better qualified to receive valuable government
contracts.96
Apparently, under the majority's logic, a pattern of contracting
without set-asides in which only .67% of city resources went to white
contractors would be acceptable. But then again, no, because a state's
passive intent to discriminate can be demonstrated by large statistical
disparity between the ratio of contract awards and the preexisting per-
centage of white contractors, many of whom benefited by past "neutral"
patters of awards. 97 Of course, the real issue is not whether to approve
distribution of public largesse by race, but rather the empty formalism of
limiting the remedy of racial discrimination's consequences to the con-
sequences of past and present intentional conduct under the illusion that
this exhausts the responsibility of the law.98 Responsibility for the con-
sequences of public power, however, should not cease merely because a
triggerman cannot be identified in situations when public power
organizes the game itself as a pattern of acceptable social practice. By
1995, in Richmond, the minority share of construction dollars shriveled
96. J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. at 538 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
97. Justice O'Connor stated:
There is no doubt that "[wihere gross statistical disparities can be shown, they alone
in a proper case may constitute prima facie proof of a pattern or practice of
discrimination" under Title VII. But it is equally clear that "[w]hen special
qualifications are required to fill particular jobs, comparisons to the general
population (rather than to the smaller group of individuals who possess the
necessary qualifications) may have little probative value."
Id. at 501.
98. Ironically, Justice O'Connor concludes with a call for strict scrutiny even in reviewing
voluntary race discrimination remedies that are defined as measures "taken in the service of the
goal of equality itself." Id. at 508-10.
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from 41.6% to 2.2%. 99 Everything continued, business as usual.
Acceptance of law as an arena for social conflict and social organi-
zation makes what the state allows, whether by intention or avoidance,
equally a part of law. The state encompasses all official articulations
and constructions of legitimated power. To demand that localities show
that qualified minorities have already overcome barriers to entry in order
to decide whether they are still overly underrepresented ignores that in
the modern welfare state we are all "contractors" of the state. Again,
ironically, "Business as usual should not mean business pursuant to the
unthinking exclusion of certain members of our society from its
rewards."' 00 There is no neutral, no ahistorical place, from which to
work out fairness.
2. GENDER DISCRIMINATION AND NOBODY'S MARKET
The Court's interpretations of anti-discrimination statutes as
applied to gender are even more transparently dependent on Nobody's
Market. Gender cases are connected to the previous reasoning of the
race cases discussed in the previous section. These statutes regulate
Nobody's Market, but gender claims disappear when cast as workers'
claims.
Taking a woman's job in AFSCME v. State of Washington,"° ' seek-
ing unemployment insurance for child bearing in Wimberly v. Labor and
Industrial Relations Commissions of Montana,"°2 choosing sterilization
to keep the best job available in Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers
International Union v. Cyanamid,"°3 or choosing an abortion defined
outside compensable medical interventions in Harris v. McRae,"°4 are
all rationalized by the appropriate responsibilities of workers as employ-
ees. In fact, AFSCME, Wimberly, Cyanamid, Harris, and the rest of the
gender cases are the same case in substance. The prevailing political
economy of the laws of the State and of work hurts the female gender by
excluding power to women as workers, as mothers, and as both workers
and mothers. It also hurts working women and all women by excluding
99. Stan Crock, "A Thunderous Impact" on Equal Opportunity, BUSINESS WEEK, June 26,
1995, at 37.
100. J.A. Croson, 488 U.S. at 510. Compare Justice O'Connor's statement with the editorial
comment of Charles Krauthammer, quoting Henry Marsh, a Black city councilman and former
Mayor of Richmond: "'The Supreme Court used to be the first place to which we turned.' It is
now the last and there is nowhere else to turn. Richmond v. Croson marks the beginning of the
end of affirmative action." Charles Krauthammer, Exit Affirmative Action, WASHINGTON POST,
Feb. 3, 1989, at A25, col. 5.
101. 770 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1985).
102. 479 U.S. 511 (1987).
103. 741 F.2d 444 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
104. 488 U.S. 297 (1980).
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power to workers as producers of value and wealth. The partnership of
the state and capital, by denying access to the capacity to produce the
conditions of community within which the self experiences its own
meaningfulness, subordinates women as class. The legal subordination
of workers manifests a deep reconnection of the market and family, and
this is formally deflected by the ideology of the separation of family and
market as institutions of personal or individualized experiences.' 05 At
the same time, the power behind the latter ideological separation of work
and family is so strong that it also remains the main naturalistic assump-
tion targeted by attacks on gender hierarchy and economic discrimina-
tion by sex.
Linda Castrelli, the lead plaintiff in the landmark comparable worth
case, AFSCME v. Washington, °6 worked in a hospital as a secretary for
the doctor heading a department and also assisted four other physicians.
She liked being a secretary despite the fact that after fifteen years she
earned fifty percent less than a carpenter. 0 7 She had thought she would
stay home with her children, but the 1970s proved that her family
required two incomes to maintain its modest lifestyle."°8
In AFSCME, when the state of Washington claimed to be interested
in comparable worth but intentionally takes the market price for sex seg-
regated job categories, the predicted disparities are not its fault. Price
taking is never intentional. The women in AFSCME contracted to work
for a market wage in jobs they could obtain despite the fact that women
dominated the job category and the wage just happened to be low
because so many women and some men were willing to compete over
the job. The State of Washington admitted that the State University
designed the job classifications to be comparable regardless of the sex of
the jobholder as a way of overcoming acknowledged pay differentials,
and admitted paying woman predominated categories at lower rates
despite the university's job classification's contribution to maintaining
sex segregated labor pools. Even so, the State did not actually pay
women less. They paid workers less in some categories because market
competition forced them to pay higher to fill certain other male-domi-
nated jobs. The market, Nobody's Market, made them do it. The
Supreme Court denied certiori to review now Justice Anthony Ken-
nedy's decision.
The same Nobody's Market operates under Justice O'Connor's
105. See Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal
Reform, 96 HARV. L REV. 1497, 1519 (1983).
106. 770 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1985).
107. See Carol Kleiman, A Secretary and a Sense of Self-Worth: Pay Equity Plaintiff Glad She
Stood Up, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, June 6, 1985, at C3.
108. See Kleiman, supra note 107.
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opinion in Wimberly.1"9 This case involved the situation of pregnant
women who were unavailable for work and therefore ineligible for
unemployment compensation, and ineligible for protection as discrimi-
nated-against women on the basis of pregnancy under the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act. In Wimberly, the Court held that while pregnancy
cannot be made the basis for denying unemployment compensation, the
loss of job due to child birth and recovery simply reflects inability to
perform the available job, and therefore, the employers' replacement of
the mother's former employment is the result of her voluntary leave. 110
The fact the employer has no other position open is the market's fault, so
that although willing to return to work, Linda Wimberly took the risk of
unemployment by becoming pregnant, which is not the Empty State's
responsibility.
According to Judge Robert Bork writing for now Justice Antonin
Scalia in Cyanamid,1 ' the market works when women choose steriliza-
tion in order to qualify for hazardous pay differentials. The Court chose
this result rather than finding that lead exposure constituted an unsafe
condition of work under OSHA (it is only a condition of employment set
by Nobody's Market).' 12 It is true because the state does not do any-
thing when law permits the market, and the market is nobody's fault.
There is no one to pin any responsibility upon, except the shadowy
gremlin. The Empty State and Nobody's Market presuppose each other
as a public-private unity which in itself operates as power. It is the
power of exclusion of an alternative understanding of state.
American Cyanamid ran a paint and chemical plant in Willow
Island, West Virginia. It provided the only industrial wage jobs for
counties around, paying entry wages six times those available for men or
women in retail or service employment. Unemployment in Pleasant
County was the highest in West Virginia. One woman, continually
beaten, could only escape her ex-husband by earning the Cyanamid
wages necessary to support herself and her children. Women were first
hired in 1975, after direct pressure from the EEOC. In spite of this pres-
sure, applicants were told repeatedly that they were too pretty to work
there or would have to work midnight shifts with bunches of horny men.
Men resented women taking their jobs, and continually sexually
harassed the women. Then in 1976, American Cyanamid abruptly
stopped hiring women and instituted the requirement of sterilization of
109. 479 U.S. 511 (1987).
110. Wimberly, 479 U.S. at 520-22.
111. 647 F.2d 383 (3d Cir. 1981).
112. See Cyanamid, 741 F.2d at 449-50.
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women working in certain parts of the plant." 3
At Cyanamid, it was made a condition of employment to choose
sterilization. This was not a "condition of work" when making paint
without lead. Therefore, paint workers can only be compensated by pay
for the health risk, and when the employer refuses to pay for such health
risks and refuses to change risky conditions of employment, the condi-
tioning of a job offer is therefore caused by the market and not by eva-
sion of OSHA regulation. A company spokesman said, "From a moral
point of view the company feels it is on the side of the angels in this
thing."'1 4 It is the woman's choice"' even though the employer
designed the product, designed the job, required the condition only of
women, was the only high wage alternative in town, and the sterilized
employee was not guaranteed continuing employment. The Occupa-
tional Health and Safety Commission responded, "An employees' deci-
sion to undergo sterilization in order to gain or retain employment grows
out of economic and social factors which operate primarily outside the
workplace. The employer neither controls nor creates these factors as he
creates or controls work processes and materials." '16
Donna Martin was so upset by the announcement that she took an
overdose of tranquilizers before deciding to have the operation. The
first woman hired at Cyanamid, Betty Riggs, said, "I did what I did
because I was more or less the sole supporter for a lot of people who
were depending on me. I couldn't let them down. I was up against a
brick wall and there was no place to go but forward."'117 Thirty-one year
old divorcee and mother of two, Barbara Cantwell, lamented, "I wish I'd
have been stronger. I didn't want to be sterile. When you're faced with
something like this from a big company you feel powerless. But this is
1978. What do you have to do to hold a normal job and support your
child?"' 18 Afterward, management referred to the women as neutered.
Two years after the women were put to the choice, the paint plant was
closed due to economic non-viability anyway. Shifted to other plant
jobs, the sterilized women were among the first to be laid off. Entering
the job market again they were labeled troublemakers. When less iso-
lated women won against a women-only sterilization rule under Title
113. See SuSAN FAULDI, BACKLASH: THE UNDECLARED WAR AGAINST AMERICAN WOMEN
440-54 (1991).
114. Bill Richards, Women Say They Had To Be Sterilized To Hold Jobs: Workplace Rule Stirs
An Outcry, THE WASHINGTON POST, A-I, Jan. 1, 1979.
115. See FAULDI, supra note 87.
116. Cyanamid, 741 F.2d at 449.
117. FAULDI, supra note 87, at 447.
118. Richards, supra note 88.
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VII in Automobile Workers v. Johnson Controls,19 they only won the
right to equal sterilization if the market would not bear the cost of elimi-
nating exposure. Even then, men would share the risk and self protective
interest only if in fact it were not only work that women accept which is
affected by the risk.
In Harris v. McRae,12 1 Medicaid need only fund medical interven-
tion in a pregnancy brought to term based on a state preference for birth
rather than abortion because the state does not force the birth, and the
market is not responsible for the woman's inadequate resources to fund
an alternative health intervention, even though most eligible persons are
working. Even when the woman is covered by an employment health
benefit, pregnancy-related care can be excluded as a gender neutral
option in defining coverage. It is the same accident of the individual's
capacity for birth, an employability cost, as in Wimberly, an
employability disability, as in Cyanamid, an employability condition.
In each case, the plaintiffs' identity as women was not treated as
cognizable because the responsibilities of employees under their terms
of employment had not been voluntarily assumed by a management
under the constraints of competition nor guaranteed against risk by the
State. The very mechanism of subordination of women in these deci-
sions about reproduction of the labor supply, pit women against their
male co-workers over the allocation of the economic wage and men's
preference to keep patriarchal hierarchy separate from political-eco-
nomic hierarchy. Women who have never been outside the market, as
well as the women whose work has been exploited without direct com-
modification of their labor, suffer a class subordination that will prove
resistant to political strategies aimed at dismantling the power of gender
discrimination by individuals or firms against individuals. The mass of
women will still obtain the resources they need and produce their pos-
sibilities for self-definition as workers. Shaw, an employability conse-
quence, is the same case as J.A. Croson, an employability opportunity,
and as Cyanamid or the rest.
It is grotesquely ironic that, because of less stringent judicial
review of statutes using gender classifications, government policies still
may use gender to redress intentional wrongs to women through gender
discrimination and also to voluntarily remedy past government discrimi-
nation against women as a group. Furthermore, gender advantages may
also voluntarily redress past social, private discrimination without nar-
rowly tailoring benefit to past specific victims as long as the use of gen-
der is not invidious. The message is that if you have a choice, identify
119. 449 U.S. 187 (1991).
120. 488 U.S. 297 (1980).
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yourself as a woman rather than an African-American. 121
Il. THE REHNQUIST COUNTER-REVOLUTION AND CIVIL RIGHTS
The liberty enforced under Carolene Products,122 liberty as inclu-
sion in a fair political process, justified judicial review of democratically
chosen public welfare as policing the process, not the ends, of majority
decisionmaking. 123  Starting in earnest with the 1975 term of court, the
Supreme Court jettisons this role of judicial review and the liberty it
embodied in favor of an enforceable liberty as exclusion from property.
Now the court polices the substance of State-based and permitted, vol-
untary relations and resource uses. Presumably a justification consistent
with judicial deference owed the democratic branches of government
will need articulation without the advantages of the Carolene Products
rationale.
While no single case announces the constitutional sea-change, and
the new agenda has taken twenty years to accomplish in fits and starts,
the blueprint for our future is Rizzo v. Goode,1 24 which pertains to 1975-
1976.
In turn, the blueprint gains specificity as this Court closes court-
house doors to rights claimants, restricts who can be sued to remedy lost
rights, limits the remedies litigants can ask for, and creates new defini-
tions of the substance of rights leaving some alleged violations solely to
the political process. Taken together, the original opinion of Brown v.
Board of Education must then itself be rewritten while still upheld. This
121. Compare Adarand v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995), with Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199
(1977) and Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977).
122. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
123. See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUTST A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW (1980); LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1985). The author's
difference with his colleague Professor Ely ultimately turns on Ely's orientation of the liberty
protected by due process as focused on consumption, and therefore on the formal political and
procedural fairness by which democratic institutions distribute [re-distribute] access to resources
and burdens of nuisance. If the judges simply police fair political process they leave the
substantive consequences of law to democratic control. In contrast, the Rehnquist Court has been
able to cry that all process costs time and money, interfering with the legislative weighing of how
much money each social priority justifies, and affecting the percentage of each program's budget
actually put to solving social problems. Institutionally, these Justices argue such an approach
leads to improper and inadequate judicial weighing of how much unfairness to a social group can
be tolerated, as opposed to other political interests outvoted, and as opposed to what degree of
government interest will be checked. The author's answer to both arguments is to demand of
judges a substantive rights articulation of the political fairness to those discrete minorities and
individuals who are subordinated by their legislative exclusion. That is, to focus the question of
liberty on production, the extent to which a right must be present to participate as an equal in
determining how the community is to be arranged with regard to the actual use of human and
socially produced opportunities.
124. 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
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make it easier to disappear the actual rationale of the case overthrowing
American apartheid--the doctrine of separate but equal.
A. Blue Print: Rizzo v. Goode - Shell Games
Justice Rehnquist begins Rizzo with the question certified to the
Court: whether the District Court as a federal court unwarrantedly
intruded into local government administration of local police services.
Almost nothing in the opinion discusses federalism, which is especially
curious since the judicial "imposition" on Philadelphia by the District
Court was on the basis of a consent decree. Instead, the opinion
explains a "central paradox" perceived in the district court's opinion:
Individual[s]... not named as parties to the action were found to
have violated the constitutional rights of particular individuals, only a
few of whom were parties plaintiff .... [T]he sole causal connection
found by the District Court between petitioners and the individual
respondents was that in the absence of a change in police disciplinary
procedures, the incidents were likely to continue to ocur, not with
respect to them, but as to the members of the classes they
represented. 125
The key to the "central paradox" of the Rizzo opinion is to translate
the problematic institutional limits of federal courts into a transformed
understanding of State action that defines enforceable limits for the con-
duct of individuals who happen to be in public employ (and, therefore,
subject to constitutional rights constraints when they affect other indi-
viduals). 126 The central paradox is, in fact, so central that it allows the
Rizzo opinion to read like a shell game in which any one of three hold-
ings can be constructed individually or in combination:
1. The respondents lacked standing by failing to show a concrete
injury directly caused by petitioners;
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not, as a substantive matter of law,
require public actors to account for injuries directly caused by other pub-
lic individuals simply because the injuries could have been prevented;
and/or
3. Constitutional equitable remedies should not supplant political
discretion because the decisionmaker cannot be charged with causing a
125. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. at 371.
126. Justice Blackmun's vigorous dissent in Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 381-87, makes it clear that the
pervasive nature of the remedy actually granted in this case does not require this transformation
because: (1) It was negotiated between the parties as acceptable to the political administration
being challenged; and (2) the remedy was predicated on a finding of fact of direct individual
responsibility for failure to supervise police activity with predictable consequences of specific
injury. How these findings of fact can be found anew by the majority raises another
institutionalist question of the power of an appellate court, which is never addressed.
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direct injury that would limit the intervention of the court in on-going
administration to a specific scope. This is especially the case in federal-
court/state-administration contexts.
The threshold question of "who gets into court" becomes the same
question as "how substantively do the constitutional rights of individuals
limit the power of the Sovereign," which becomes the same question as
"what is appropriate equitable relief for courts to grant against adminis-
tration of government." This identity holds only if legal disputes must
be limited to a certain form, the traditional common law adjudication of
disputed individual interests-a person A specifically causes a specific
injury to a person B, who requests a specific relief of no more than the
specific injury.'27
On the threshold question of standing, Justice Rehnquist "enter-
tain[s] serious doubts whether on the facts as found there was made out
the requisite Article III case or controversy between the individually
named respondents and petitioners."128 These doubts are overcome
somehow because the district court "bridged the gap between the facts
shown at trial and the class-wide relief sought with an unprecedented
theory of § 1983 liability." '129 Yet when one examines the facts relevant
to the next subsection on potential liability, there seems to be no liability
present because the petitioners did not exercise direct responsibility for
causing the injuries-in-fact to the respondents.1 30 The opinion, there-
fore, boldly equates the causation-in-fact standing requirement for an
Article III personal injury to the required meaning of statutory § 1983
liability, without arguing the exclusivity of direct causation for the
responsibility of state actors to private citizens. In other words, the
Court says, on section II A (justiciability), see section II B (scope of
liability); and on section II B, see section II A." '131 This maneuver is
accomplished by interpreting the language of § 1983, which states
"every person who, under the color of law subjects, or causes to be sub-
jected ..... " to be exhausted by direct, intentional acts of one individual
to another individual. This reading makes the words "subjects, or
causes to be subjected,"(italics added), redundant and renders two
127. See generally Robert D. Goldstein, A Swann Song for Remedies: Equitable Relief in the
Burger Court, 13 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1, 1, 3, 5, 16-18, 44 n.219, 55 (1978).
128. Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 371-72. "This hypothesis is even more attenuated than those
allegations of future injury found insufficient in O'Shea [v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974)] to
warrant invocation of federal jurisdiction. . .[U]nlike O'Shea, this case did not arise on the
pleadings." Id. at 372-73.
129. Id. at 373.
130. See id. at 375-76.
131. "In Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), the Court said that § 1983 'should be read
against the background of tort liability that makes a man responsible for the natural consequences
of his actions . . .' Id. at 384.
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clearly intended different forms of governmental responsibility into the
narrower first inquiry only. The only causation notion allowed comes
from the limited notion of causation necessary to reject justiciability in
O'Shea v. Littleton. 132
In section IIB, Rehnquist justifies this cramped notion of actor
responsibility under Section 1983 by referring to Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Board of Education,133 in which broad equitable relief is
justified because the segregation was implemented by state authorities.
He quotes the famous line, "Once a right and a violation have been
shown, the scope of a district court's equitable powers to remedy past
wrongs is broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent to equitable
remedies."' 134 By this facile factual distinction, Chief Justice Rehnquist
then limits equity to the remedy of direct intentional acts of specific
governmental decisionmakers. Only direct intentional acts can be reme-
died under § 1983. Once more, in section 1iB (scope of § 1983 liabil-
ity), see section IIC (limits of equitable relief).
The same manipulation occurs in section IIC, which addresses the
issue of the appropriate scope of equitable relief. Justice Rehnquist
states that "[g]oing beyond considerations concerning the existence of a
live controversy and threshold statutory liability, we must address an
additional and novel claim advanced by respondent classes." 135 If this
language seems to rest the basis of Rizzo on the scope of equitable relief
that a district court can grant, such suspicions are quickly dashed. First,
the Supreme Court would have a hard time revising the discretion of the
trier of fact; however, the issue is never discussed. Second, by empha-
sizing that the "nature of the violation determines the scope of the rem-
edy,"' 136 the opinion refers back to the line of cases dealing with the
issue of standing to explain the nature of the violation. In other words,
on section IIC see section 1iB, then see section IIA.
Justice Rehnquist's reasoning ignores the factual context of Swann
itself. Ongoing federal supervision was necessary because the effects of
apartheid were not intended to attack specific individual school children.
Rather, they were intended to disempower an entire race within a com-
munity. Such a pattern and plan of unconstitutional harm never will be
remedied by a few dollars or an order to stop harming specific individu-
als in the future. As the judges in Brown, Green, and Swann recognized,
132. 414 U.S. 488 (1974).
133. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
134. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. at 16.
135. Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 377.
136. Id. at 378 (quoting Swann v. Board of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1970)).
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the system of privilege must be dismantled, regardless of the actors in
place.
B. Construction: Federal Court Litigation Doctrines
1. JUSTICIABILITY: REDUCING PLAINTIFFS
The first doctrine to be replaced on the basis of Rizzo covers Article
III interpretation of justiciability, which is also the first threshold
required before access to federal courts necessary to litigate civil or con-
stitutional rights. During the same 1975 term, in Warth v. Seldin,13 7
Justice Powell adopted the strict causation of legal damage theory neces-
sary to the Rehnquist reasoning underlying Rizzo, in order to define the
new Article III definition of case and controversy necessary to proper
standing and timing.
Under the prior "good fight" standard of Baker v. Carr,38 an indi-
vidual must plead "such a personal stake in the outcome of the contro-
versy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illu-
mination of difficult constitutional questions." '39 As a matter of institu-
tional separation of powers, the assurance of a good adversarial
presentation would allow the Court a vehicle by which to assess in fact
whether the political branch had exceeded its constitutional authority,
something which it had no legal authority to do, and which, if factual
adverse consequences accrued to the individual, must be protected by
the residual notion of negative rights protected liberty. Indeed, such a
notion of liberty must be protected by judges because the majority
always will believe that their interests lie within legitimate governmental
recognition. Legislatures lose no power legitimately granted if judges
diligently keep them from exceeding such powers as long as judges do
not limit any choices within the sphere of the power granted. Once mar-
ket interdependence depends on democratic permission to use property
and nuisance prioritization and prevention, the Baker standing doctrine
act as a gatekeeping mechanism to allow access to federal courts. This
parallels the requirement of the Carolene Products three-fold explana-
tion of legitimate judicial review countering majoritarian primacy.
Keeping unconstitutional powers from being executed in the name of
one rights holder preserves a residual liberty for all. 4 '
137. 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
138. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
139. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 204.
140. Plus, if the courts should be too shy in exercising review within the added prudential
concerns it holds, and should Congress want additional judicial review of itself, Congress could
mandate federal court jurisdiction removing these latter barriers under its own Article IfI checking
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Yet, there is a change in judicial role which is limited by the new
Article III standing doctrine in Warth:
The Art. III judicial power exists only to redress or otherwise to pro-
tect against injury to the complaining party, even though the court's
judgment may benefit others collaterally. A federal court's jurisdic-
tion therefore can be invoked only when the plaintiff himself has suf-
fered "some threatened or actual injury resulting from the putatively
illegal action...141
Government is to be kept within legal authority only to the extent
necessary to make the individual, who is before the court, whole.
Enforceable constitutional liberty is not the liberty left after limited
grants of power. The interest of all in liberty now becomes irrelevant to
the federal courts' protection of individuals. In Warth, a broader juris-
diction could have been attached to Powell's language ("or otherwise to
protect against injury" or "resulting from the putative illegality", or a
broader notion of "illegal action") than the intentional acts of govern-
mental officials, except that precisely all three constructions were
explicitly eliminated by the re-interpretation of Section 1983 substantive
jurisdiction of "causes, or subjects to be caused" in the shell game of
Rizzo. 142
powers. See, e.g., Administrative Procedure Act, § 10, 5 U.S.C. § 555 (1996) ("any person
aggrieved...").
141. Warth, 422 U.S. at 499.
142. The purely prudential standards of the good fight era required pleading a double nexus
between personal injury and the legality of the action challenged. Generalized from its taxpayer
standing origin, the double nexus test required pleading (1) a relationship between the plaintiff's
status as an injured person and the action of the defendant; and (2) a relationship between the
injury status and the zone of legal interests protected by the legal claim limiting the defendant.
Indeed, the aberration of Justice Burger's disingenuous holding on standing and ripeness in
Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59 (1972), was based on the less
strict causation conception of "but for causation" - but for the actions of government injury would
not occur - should never meet the prior term's WarthiRizzo doctrine. The facts of Duke Power
meet neither required nexus. In that case, fisherman complained that nuclear power plants
licensed under the economic expectations of the nuclear power liability act, which set a cap on
damages from any single catastrophic accident, would not be built "but for" the profitability
assured by liability limitation. Having been built, heat discharge from the operation of these
plants into neighboring waterways raised the water temperature beyond fish tolerance, eliminating
the pleasure of fishing those waters. They argued that the rush to the courthouse to avoid being
left beyond the damage cap could leave future injured parties without legal redress thereby
arbitrarily denying them due process of law. The injury of dead fish in no way related to the
relation of liability limits to future injured accident victims (the first nexus) and it does not relate
dead fish to the interests of due process to liability limits. The power plant may never blow when
either fish or fishermen are still alive or within thousands of miles. Burger claimed that there is
"no better time than now" (or no better party than fishermen to litigate due process rights of
unborn future litigants) in order to settle the constitutionality of statutory economic incentives to
development. Only the cynic would suggest that this was said solely because of the subsidy to big
business and wealthy investors. Apparently, Duke meets the Warth standard of minimum Article
HI standing when it can't meet supposedly higher prudential standards.
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In Warth, low income plaintiffs, Ortiz, Reyes, Broadnax, and Sin-
kler, alleged that suburban Penfield, New York, set residential property
value zoning requirements in order to intentionally exclude occupancy
on the basis of race by rendering low income housing impracticable to
build. 4 3 For purposes of standing, the allegations pled must be taken as
true, despite the difficulty of proving such allegations at trial, even
after generous federal discovery. These low-income plaintiffs failed
Article III standing because:
[T]here remains the question whether petitioners' inability to locate
suitable housing in Penfield reasonably can be said to have resulted,
in any concrete demonstrable way, from respondents' alleged consti-
tutional and statutory infractions. Petitioners must allege facts from
which it reasonably could be inferred that, absent the respondents'
restrictive zoning practices, there is a substantial probability that they
would have been able to purchase or lease in Penfield and that, if the
court affords the relief requested, the asserted inability of petitioners
will be removed. 45
The plaintiffs in Warth could have proven intentional race discrimi-
nation despite the difficulty of proof, and they could have asked the
Court to strike the zoning restrictions. Nevertheless, the Court denied
standing because the Plaintiffs depended on private builders who may or
may not have built affordable housing.'46 Warth allows official racism
to continue without even a slap on the wrists. This is a substantial
change in the role, practice, and liberty expected from judicial review.
Other plaintiffs in Warth included homeowners already living in
Penfield, who alleged that denial of low income plaintiffs' constitutional
rights deprived them of the aesthetic and cultural advantages of living in
an integrated community. These residents were denied standing to raise
the rights of third parties thought to be better litigants of the issues.
Additionally, plaintiff builders alleged that they had in the past sought
zoning variances from Penfield to build low income housing, while also
being the persons directly affected by exclusionary zoning. 147 The build-
ers also were denied standing to raise the constitutional rights of third
parties. Although the low-income parties were not allowed to bring suit,
the builders were also not allowed. They are not allowed under an
exception to prudential requirements because they could plead no instant
completed plans to build where they were prohibited from doing so
143. Warth, 422 U.S. at 495-96.
144. See id. at 501.
145. Id. at 504.
146. Id. at 505-07.
147. Id. at 515.
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under past variance denials.' 48 The easiest plaintiffs to dismiss included
Warth, a resident and taxpayer of center city Rochester, who alleged that
Penfield's illegal zoning forced crowding of low income residences with
the attendant multiplication of social costs onto the city of Rochester,
which could not wash its hands of social responsibility for the infrastruc-
ture necessary to the economic base of the entire area.'49
On the other hand, citizens of Penfield could abandon responsibility
for the housing of the laborers and unemployed who were zoned by
default into Rochester. This was true even though the low-income popu-
lation as the metropolitan area's labor pool determined the market wage
that produced the wealth which profited luxury home owners in the area.
White flight to the suburbs in fear of central city attempts to overcome
racial imbalances in educational opportunity simply reinforces the will
to escape and exclude.
Justice Brennan, in dissent, could only explain the overruling, in
fact, of the Baker standard as an opposition on the part of the Powell
majority to the merits of the equal protection claims of illegality.
Scarcely four years after Warth, the Court decided the less well
known case of Gladstone v. Bellwood Realty Co.,' 50 again in an opinion
by Justice Powell, who stated, "In order to satisfy Art. III, the plaintiff
must show that he personally has suffered some actual or threatened
injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant....
Otherwise, the exercise of federal jurisdiction 'would be gratuitous and
thus inconsistent with the Art. III limitation'.' 15'
Homeowners in suburban Bellwood, Illinois, alleged that racial
steering by Bellwood Realty Company was transforming their commu-
nity from a stable, integrated neighborhood into a predominantly "Negro
community," depriving them of the social and professional benefits of
living in an integrated society. 152 Although Justice Powell found the
pleadings too general, he nonetheless found them to meet Article III on
an astounding rationalization.' 53 After Warth, assuming Bellwood
Realty was judicially constrained in fact, how could any judicial remedy
aimed exclusively toward the company lead to any probability of assur-
ance that any "white" person would ever choose to seek a future home in
Bellwood or that one would be on the market at such time. No matter.
Justice Powell explains: "The presence of a genuine injury [as pled]
should be ascertainable on the basis of discrete facts presented at
148. Id. at 516.
149. Id. at 508-09.
150. 441 U.S. 91 (1979).
151. Gladstone v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979).
152. See id. at 95.
153. See id. at 110.
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trial." 154 He boldly footnotes:
This should include an inquiry into the extent of [Bellwood Realty's]
participation in the purchase, sale, and rental of residences in the tar-
get area, the number and race of their customers, and the type of
housing desired by customers. Evidence of this kind may be relevant
to the establishment of the necessary causal connection between the
alleged conduct and the asserted injury.155
Justice Powell further noted: "[A]lthough standing generally is a matter
dealt with at the earliest stages of litigation, usually on the pleadings, it
some times remains to be seen whether the factual allegations of the
complaint necessary for standing will be supported adequately by the
evidence adduced at trial."
' 156
The threshold requirement Justice Powell speaks of, where the facts
alleged are taken as true in order to gain access to open discovery,
designed to encourage settlement-and as a constitutional matter to save
scarce judicial resources and prevent judicial overreaching-should be
decided after trial, in order to decide whether the trial should take place
at all. Furthermore, since justiciability applies at every moment of a
federal judicial action including final appeals, any such trial showing
that the trial should not have taken place can have absolutely no legal
effect.
Moreover, how can the holding in Gladstone be reconciled with the
holding in Warth? The two cases are identical in terms of the legal
claim,157 especially as articulated by Justice Rehnquist, in his dissent. 5
The same judge decided both cases. The same standing doctrine was
applied. The obvious difference is in institutional practice-that stand-
ing to bring suit will be decided in Gladstone after discovery and trial-
simply begs more justification. Both cases are difficult to prove.
The only difference between the two cases relates to remedy. In
Gladstone, the enforcement of the legal claim is an order to stop a spe-
cific person's (company's) erosion of integration where whites want
integration. In Warth, the Court must reserve jurisdiction to review new
protectionist zoning requirements, also neutral on their face, which are
legitimate if not racially motivated, where whites do not want integra-
tion. Unless the mere difficulty of remedy decides whose constitutional
protection from racial housing discrimination are rights at all, the only
explanation of difference in outcome seems racial. Is the Supreme Court
racist? Who knows? But, racially marked outcomes will be the inevita-
154. Id. at 90.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 91.
157. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 1983, with Title VII § 803(b).
158. Id. at 116-28.
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ble consequence of the new limits on access to the federal courts. As
Martha Mahoney analyzes the Shaw line of voting rights cases, the race
of the plaintiffs becomes determinative of standing.
In the progeny of Shaw, positioned white perceptions are further
developed as constitutional doctrine, particularly in the much-criti-
cized treatment of standing for plaintiffs challenging majority-minor-
ity districts. In Hays v. Louisiana, the court held that plaintiffs who
lived in a majority-black district had standing to challenge the state's
redistricting plan, but that plaintiffs in a mostly-white district did not.
If a line is drawn intentionally to divide black from white, it inten-
tionally classifies by race on both sides, unless whiteness is invisible.
If intentionally race-conscious districting were really the key to find-
ing a constitutional violation, voters from both districts must have
standing to bring challenges. Justice O'Connor first emphasized that
standing doctrine requires "individualized harm" and stated that there
was no evidence that there was any particular racial makeup sought
for District t, unlike District 4. She avoided further discussion by
focusing on the lack of "representational harm" to the Hays plain-
tiffs-the argument that when a district is created to effectuate the
perceived common interests of one racial group, elected officials are
more likely to believe that their primary obligation is to represent
only the members of that group, rather than the constituency as a
whole. To Justice O'Connor, representational harms are caused by
racial classifications; the court has never said that-and cannot say-
that representational harm derives from placement into a district in
which one's race does not predominate. The Hays decision did not
identify the race of the plaintiffs, but since representational harm was
not only held to derive from living in "racially gerrymandered" dis-
tricts, and the plaintiffs lacked standing because they lived outside the
mostly-minority district, "racially gerrymandered" meant mostly-
black and the "representational harm" was harm to whites. The Hays
plaintiffs were indeed white by not naming their race.
The decision on standing in Bush v. Vera brought the subtext of
Hays into the open and made its rationale incoherent. In Bush, again,
the plurality opinion by Justice O'Connor did not mention the race of
the plaintiffs. In fact, the decision found standing for both white and
minority plaintiffs who lived in a mostly-black district; plaintiffs who
lived in mostly-white districts did not have standing. O'Connor's
plurality opinion in Bush is a perfect example of the positioned white
perception of race at work. Even though the district was drawn
"deliberately excludes . . . wealthy white neighborhoods," only
whites and minorities in mostly-minority standing. Taken together,
Hays and Bush reveal that the current Court believes black domi-
nance is the crucial element to create "personal injury" to any plain-
tiff. In the anti-transformation cases, the Supreme Court has made
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color and power evasion into constitutional standards.15 9
Access to federal courts is further doctrinally narrowed by Justice
Rehnquist in a taxpayer case, Valley Forge Christian College v. Ameri-
cans United for Separation of Church and State.160 In a development
that should have been predictable from Rizzo through Warth, the pruden-
tial double nexus test of the Baker era taxpayer case, Flast v. Cohen,161
is now considered to be an Article III minimum requirement. In Valley
Forge, the Court held that illegal use of one's tax contribution must be
caused by misuse of abuse of congressional taxing and spending power,
first nexus, and the tax loss must be protected by an individual right
which limits such taxing and spending by Congress, second nexus.1 62
Where the first and second nexus are not satisfied, the remedy cannot be
limited to the exact injury directly caused by defendant officials' uncon-
stitutional act. While the First Amendment's anti-establishment clause
prevents direct appropriation by Congress to religious schools like Val-
ley Forge Christian College, the plaintiffs' claim failed the first nexus
because the Executive gave away surplus land and buildings, an act not
related to Congressional taxing of individuals.163
This new Article III version of the double nexus test was then
applied beyond taxpayer suits by Justice White in City of Los Angeles v.
Lyons,6 4 a police brutality case. Lyons also clears up the ambiguity of
which the holding of Rizzo v. Goode will emerge as a matter of citation:
denial of standing, substantive protection of rights under Section 1983,
or limits of equitable relief. The Rizzo opinion will be cited by the Court
to establish all three. Justice White stated Lyons:
We further observed that case - or - controversy considerations 'obvi-
ously shade into those determining whether the complaint states a
sound basis for equitable relief,'. . . The Court also held that plain-
tiff's showing at trial of a relatively few [the district court held a
finding of fact to the contrary] instances of violations by individual
police officers, without any showing of a deliberate policy on behalf
of the named defendants [again contra to the district court's finding
of facts], did not provide a basis for equitable relief.... No exten-
sion of O'Shea and Rizzo is necessary to hold that respondent Lyons
has failed to demonstrate a case or controversy with the City that
would justify the equitable relief sought. 165
159. Mahoney, supra note 14, at 40-41 (footnotes omitted).
160. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State,
Inc., 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
161. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
162. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 479-80.
163. Id. at 479.
164. 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
165. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 103-05 (1983).
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Incredibly, Justice White found standing for damage claims against
the officers and perhaps the City of Los Angeles when the plaintiff was
subjected to a choke-hold during a traffic stop, but he held that the alle-
gations insufficiently plead causation for a continuing injunction against
the City:
In order to establish an actual controversy in this case, Lyons would
have had not only to allege that he would have another encounter
with the police but also to make the incredible assertion either, 1) that
all police in Los Angeles always choke any citizen with whom they
happen to have an encounter or, 2) that the City ordered or authorized
police officers to act in such manner.166
Justice White did acknowledge that this represented an unprece-
dented rejection of notice pleading underlying the chief policy of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in favor of the fact pleading system
Congress replaced in 1937. He also acknowledges that this change will
mean that future violations of constitutional liberty will occur which
could have been prevented. Justice White wrote, "Of course, it may be
that among the countless encounters between the police and the citizens
of a great city such as Los Angeles, there will be certain instances in
which strangleholds will be illegally applied and injury and death uncon-
stitutionally inflicted."' 67
White fails to note that in fifteen percent of police chokeholds, the
citizen dies. Justice Marshall replied in dissent:
The Court's decision removes an entire class of constitutional viola-
tions from the equitable powers of a federal court. It immunizes from
prospective equitable relief any policy that authorizes persistent dep-
rivations of constitutional rights as long as no individual can establish
with substantial certainty that he will be injured, or injured again in
the future .... The federal judicial power is now limited to levying a
toll for such a systematic constitutional violation.
168
The Empty State creates a Nobody's Market of adhesion contracts
for constitutional rights and citizens' lives. There are some qualifica-
tions: the democratic majority wants to take someone out, the demo-
cratic majority is willing to pay, there is no good faith immunity defense
(an issue undecided in Lyons, which arose on an interlocutory appeal),
and the perpetrators are caught, no available constitutional remedy will
be available to prevent the "disappearance." Coincidentally, the Rodney
King affair followed Lyons.
Perhaps the leading standing case with respect to civil rights, and
166. Id. at 105-06.
167. Id. at 108.
168. Id. at 137.
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the most influential precedent of the Warth/Rizzo era, is Allen v.
Wright.'6 9 In Allen, the Court decided whether the parents of African-
American children could sue the I.R.S. for failure to follow statutory
requirements denying charitable status to private schools practicing
racial exclusion on the allegation that such illegal subsidy contributes to
predominantly minority public schools. 170 Justice O'Connor seemingly
loosened the Valley Forge articulation of strict causation by requiring
that the "plaintiff must allege personal injury fairly traceable to the
defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the
requested relief."' 71 But watch what they do, not what they say:
It is in their complaint's second injury that respondents allege harm
to a concrete, personal interest that can support standing in some cir-
cumstances. The injury they identify - their children's diminished
ability to receive an education in a racially integrated school - is,
beyond any doubt, not only judicially cognizable, but as shown by
cases from Brown v. Board of Education, to Bob Jones University v.
United States, one of the most serious injuries recognized in our legal
system. Despite the constitutional importance of curing the injury
alleged by respondents, however, the federal judiciary may not
redress it unless standing requirements are met. In this case, respon-
dents' second claim of injury cannot support standing because the
injury alleged is not fairly traceable to the Government conduct
respondent's challenge as unlawful.172
Why not? The answer is Nobody's Market. Despite unlawful
actions of the I.R.S., the private school's tax subsidy may not be neces-
sary to its survival because white parents might be willing to pay more.
Per the Empty State, the specific children's injury caused by the I.R.S.
via intentional restructuring of the market may not match the public
schools that are changed with the black children's future schools. Jus-
tice O'Connor cited Rizzo: "When a plaintiff seeks to enjoin the activity
of a government agency, even within a unitary court system, his case
must contend with 'the well-established rule that the Government has
traditionally been granted the widest latitude in the dispatch of its own
internal affairs.'"173 She then opined:
When transported into the Art. III context, that principle grounded as
it is in the idea of separation of powers, counsels against recognizing
standing in a case brought, not to enforce specific legal obligations
whose violations works a direct harm, but to seek a restructuring of
169. 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
170. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 739 (1984).
171. Id. at 751.
172. Id. at 756-57 (citations omitted).
173. Id. at 761 (quoting Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 378-379) (citations omitted).
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the apparatus by the Executive Branch to fulfill its legal duties. 17 4
Finally, attempt to reconcile Allen and Rizzo with Justice Clarence
Thomas's riff in the 1993 case, Associated General Contractors v. City
of Jacksonville.17 5 In Associated General Contractors, Jacksonville vol-
untarily required only an approximate 10% set aside for minority con-
tractors to remedy its own past responsibility for discrimination. 176 This
measure was modeled after the 10% federal government set aside for
minority contractors of federal construction projects intended to volunta-
rily remedy federal subsidy of past discrimination. 17 7 White contractors
alleged that the mere use of race in awarding contracts was violative of
equal protection. Nevertheless, such a set aside is necessary, of course,
if any voluntary remedy scheme is possible. The question presented
was, "whether in order to have standing to challenge the ordinance, an
association of contractors is required to show that one of its members
would have received a contract absent the ordinance." '178 "Petitioner
alleged only that many of its members 'regularly bid on and perform
construction work for the City of Jacksonville,' and that 'they would
have.., bid on... designated set aside contracts but for the restrictions
imposed' by the ordinance."' 179
Bidding does not assure contract. The past does not predict the
future. No allegations were made that all contracts, even in the approxi-
mate set aside, always go to minorities.' 80 The remedy may have been
applied to the correct specific victims."'8 No matter, the set aside denied
white contractors a market opportunity, despite the inconsistency of the
fact that they operate in Nobody's Market:
When the government erects a barrier that makes it more difficult for
members of one group to obtain a benefit than it is for members of
another group, a member of the former group seeking to challenge
the barrier need not allege that he would have obtained the benefit but
for the barrier in order to establish standing. The "injury in fact" in
an equal protection case of this variety is the denial of equal treat-
ment resulting from the imposition of the barrier, not the ultimate
ability to obtain the benefit. 182
174. Id. at 761.
175. 508 U.S. 656 (1993).
176. Associated General Contractors v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 658 (1993).
177. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 482 (1988), (upholding the constitutionality of
minority set asides in federal construction projects to remedy past discrimination). But see
Adarand v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995).
178. Associated General Contractors, 508 U.S. at 658.
179. Id. at 659 (citations omitted).
180. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983).
181. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 743 (1984).
182. Associated General Contractors, 508 U.S. at 666.
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Tell it to Ortiz and Reyes, to Lyons, and to the Allen parents and
children! was decided under the Associated General Contractor same
Market, same Empty State intervention as subsidizer, but involved vol-
untary remedy of past constitutional violation unlike Allen: white con-
tractors in, Black school children out, Black strangled males out,
regardless of the admittedly provable illegality of governmental actors.
Retrospectively apply the WarthiRizzo/Lyons/Allen standing analy-
sis to Brown v. Board of Education I. Assuming "proper" judicial
respect for separation of powers, defined in part by Article III, Brown
never should have been decided. African-American parents pled proper
first nexus, the injury of harm to the education of their children directly
caused by segregation imposed by specific governmental actors. But
can judicial relief be crafted under the required second nexus, that the
actual injury determines that the remedy reach only the harm cognizable
under the zone of interests protected by the legal claim? Under Lyons,
damages would be available to specific children harmed in monetizable
ways for past discrimination. A simple injunction against the School
Board to stop segregation would be available. However, since future
performance or school populations are subject to no crystal ball, an
ongoing injunctive jurisdiction could not be framed to only include
relief to specific past victims. New victims would have to bring their
own suits and proof.
Suppose the school board chose to institute race blind voluntary
assignment. Under Allen, the state is absolved of responsibility. More-
over, by the time the suit reached final decision five years after being
started, many of the original plaintiffs would have graduated. As a
result, the relief could not be limited to the specific injuries of the specif-
ically injured. The standing game is a judicially - rigged game of the
same cloth as the legislatively rigged game that had been targeted in
Carolene Products as the appropriate and necessary subject of judicial
control.
2. SECTION 1983 AND STATE ACTION: RELEASING DEFENDANTS
The 1983 action of Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks183 raises the
question of who has the constitutional responsibility to protect the plain-
tiff's procedural due process rights. Treating responsibility as a compo-
nent of the substantive content of the fourteenth amendment's state
action requirement limits who can be sued in the same way justiciability
screens out potentially liable actors under a similar threshold question of
who are the proper plaintiffs:
183. 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
2000]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
A claim ...under § 1983 must embody at least two elements.
Respondents are first bound to show that they have been deprived of
a right "secured by the Constitution and the laws" of the United
States. They must secondly show that Flagg Brothers deprived them
of this right acting "under color of any statute" of the State of New
York. 184
Although the Flagg Brothers plaintiff demonstrated that the ware-
houseman's authorization to sell her goods for nonpayment of a disputed
bill stemmed from the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) in New
York, she could not identify a "secured" right by a showing that the
injury was properly attributable to the State of New York. Because no
State actor sold Mrs. Brooks's goods there was no State action although
the sale was permitted only by the (U.C.C.) The U.C.C. is mere authori-
zation. Law as policy is not State action!
The Court's description of the factual case in Flagg Brothers is
virtually indistinguishable from the fact pattern described in Rizzo: "It
must be noted that respondents have named no public officials as
defendants in this action .... This total absence of overt official involve-
ment plainly distinguishes this case from earlier decisions imposing pro-
cedural restrictions on creditor's remedies such as North Georgia
Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc."'85
Because no specific governmental actor directly contributed to the
specific action of the warehouseman, by either delegating an exclusively
sovereign function ordering the choice leading to the plaintiff's depriva-
tion, or specifically approving the action taken as policy, the Court
found no state action present. Although the sheriff removed Mrs.
Brooks' possessions during an eviction and placed them in a private
warehouse, the warehouseman's self-help was simply permitted by the
background rules of public order available to all private decisions. The
sharp line drawn between public and private power prevents a private
individual from using constitutional rights to interfere with other private
individuals' state-permitted choices. Such interference, if allowed,
would be a seemingly perverse use of court protections of the bounda-
ries of public power. By limiting liability to direct causation, the indi-
vidualization of public responsibility allows the creation of a sharp
conceptual division of public and private power through the doctrine of
state action.1 86 Not surprisingly, it does more. Beyond doctrinal sym-
184. Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 155.
185. Id. at 157 (citations omitted).
186. See LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1147-74 (1978); see also, e.g.,
Thompson, Piercing the Veil of State Action: The Revisionist Theory and a Mythical Application
to Self-Help Repossession, 1977 Wisc. L. REv. 1; Glennon & Nowak, A Functional Analysis of
the Fourteenth Amendment "State Action" Requirement, 1976 S. CT. REV. 221; Black, Foreword:
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metry, both Rizzo and Flagg Brothers evidence an identical understand-
ing of federal courts as limited institutions.
The fact that conduct is private does not insulate it from govern-
ment control. The fourteenth amendment shields it only from federal
court review. Such conduct will be supervised, if so desired, by state or
local legislative majorities in the name of the public good. If in Rizzo,
the question of who is an appropriate party to trigger judicial review
becomes equivalent to the question of what remedies can be applied to
actors challenged by those plaintiffs, then both questions are collapsed
into the state action inquiry of what private actors must submit to judi-
cial review of constitutionally imposed responsibility for the exercise of
public power. In both cases, given the premise of direct causation evi-
denced by Rizzo and Flagg Brothers, the State is not responsible for
individual choices. It simply limits the scope of responsibility to that of
individual governmental actors. Despite lip service in string cites, Shel-
ley v. Kraemer'87 has been overruled in its reasoning and limited almost
completely to preventing judicial enforcement of racially restricted
covenants.
Dividing the public and private power into spheres defined by indi-
vidualizing the actors involved necessarily forces property to become
the creature of positive legislation.' 88 Because the allocation of
resources is inherently a product of legislative permission, there cannot
be any causal responsibility of the public for the choices of resource use
by individuals if any individual choices are to remain private. Paradoxi-
cally, just as in Rizzo, the "State" ceases to have any conceptual interest
independent of an aggregation of its officials. As Justice Marshall noted
in dissent in Flagg Brothers:
[T]he Court approaches the question before us as if it can be decided
without reference to the role that the State has always played in lien
execution by forced sale. In so doing, the Court treats the State as if
it were, to use the Court's words, "a monolithic, abstract concept
hovering in the legal stratosphere." '89
"State Action, "Equal Protection, and California's Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69 (1967);
Williams, The Twilight of State Action, 41 TEXAS L. REV. 347 (1963); William Van Alstyne &
Kenneth Karst, State Action, 14 STAN. L. REV. 3 (1961). But see Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436
U.S. 149 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("But it is no longer possible, if it ever was, to believe
that a sharp line can be drawn between private and public actions.").
187. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
188. "[P]roperty interest is not a monolithic, abstract concept hovering in the legal
stratosphere. It is a bundle of rights in personalty, the metes and bounds of which are determined
by the decisional and statutory law of the State of New York." Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436
U.S. 149, 160 n.10 (1978).
189. Id. at 168.
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Justice Stevens in dissenting articulates the perversity to our Con-
stitution's power/rights unitary structure:
This "framework of rules" is premised on the assumption that the
State will control non-consensual deprivations of property and that
the State's control will, in turn, be subject to the restrictions of the
Due Process clause. The power to order legally binding surrenders of
property and the constitutional restrictions on that power are neces-
sary correlatives in our system. In effect today's decision allows the
State to divorce these two elements by the simple expedient of trans-
ferring the implementation of its policy to private parties. Because
the Fourteenth Amendment does not countenance such a division of
power and responsibility, I respectfully dissent.190
Flagg Brothers leads to this absurd conclusion in the Section 1983
trilogy of State action cases decided in 1982, including Lugar v.
Edmondson Oil Co.,19 1 and Rendell-Baker v. Cohn.192 In Lugar, an ex-
parte attachment of business assets as part of a debt collection action
counts as State action because it must be hand stamped by a court clerk
upon filing, while in Rendell-Baker there is no State action demanding
Due Process when a private school in Boston dismisses a teacher where
the school is formed as a designated institution for problem children
excluded from public schools. These students comprise virtually the
entire student body, and the local school board funds ninety-five percent
of the school's costs, determines the curriculum, grants the diplomas,
approves the hiring of each teacher, but leaves out the firing decision.' 93
Marsh v. Alabama,'94 under the public function doctrine, has been
limited to its facts, the privately owned company town. In Marsh, the
need for a speaker to effectively reach her targeted listeners to have any
meaningful First Amendment right allowed a Jehovah's Witness access
to the business block of the company town because it functioned identi-
cally to any municipality. 95 The early extension of opening the strip
shopping center as a forum of free speech functionally equivalent to the
business block of a company town, the court house square, or commons
of an ordinary community is completely dashed by Hudgens v. NLRB.'9 6
In Hudgens, Private property owners of increasingly enclosed malls sur-
rounded by acres of parking were held to have an absolute right to allow
only those non-commercial activities they believe are consistent with
190. Id. at 178-79.
191. 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
192. 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
193. The fate of Shelley becomes the fate of Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365
U.S. 715 (1961).
194. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
195. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 507-09 (1946).
196. 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
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maximizing purchasing and consumption. 197 Anyone wishing to contact
patrons for free speech purposes - including labor organization of shop
or mall employees - has a completely adequate alternative to hold signs
or converse with passengers of enclosed cars from sidewalks or the
berms adjacent to the edges of the parking lots as the cars whiz down the
off ramps of the expressway. Anyone with even modest wealth can
motor from gated, walled private communities, to enclosed parking atop
vast enclosed malls with shopping and health, recreation, and other serv-
ices, without ever having to confront a remotely non-mainstream or
unpopular idea. The result of Warth and its progeny is that walled com-
munities allowed to incorporate can divorce themselves completely from
public responsibilities for problems associated with the infrastructure or
social congestion of the low wage labor pools necessary to the produc-
tion base of the cities they depend upon.198
3. EQUITABLE RELIEF: EXCUSING DEFENDANTS
Assuming the Brown parents could get into court, what would hap-
pen to the remedy phase, Brown v. Board of Education ii.199 At the
other end of the central paradox of Rizzo, a similar obscurity has been
created in the doctrinal development of the equitable remedy. A sharp
distinction has been drawn between those injuries that can be traced to
an unconstitutional act of an identifiable government official and those
injuries that might be traced to private reactions to judicially ordered,
but time consuming, relief from past constitutional violations permitted
by the original officials and their successors.
In Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler,2" Justice Rehn-
quist used this causation-based distinction because of the need to pre-
serve the public-private distinction. He stated, "These limits are in part
tied to the necessity of establishing that school authorities have in some
manner caused unconstitutional segregation, for '[a]bsent a constitu-
tional violation there would be no basis for judicially ordering assign-
ment of students on a racial basis'."201 Such a view assumes, however,
that private housing choices are irrelevant to the school board's deci-
sions to incorporate residence patterns into educational resource alloca-
tions, both before and after findings of constitutional violation. This is
197. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 521-23 (1976).
198. See generally Richard T. Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal
Analysis, 107 HARv. L. REv. 1841 (1994).
199. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
200. 427 U.S. 424 (1976).
201. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 434 (1976).
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an assumption difficult in both fact2" 2 and law.2 °3
Compare Green v. County School Board,2 °4 in which an earlier
Court expressly recognized the difficulty in deciding to treat the rela-
tionship between the scope of the remedy and the underlying violation
of right as connected and constrained but not coextensive, as Justice
Rehnquist would have it. In the Green Court's review of freedom of
choice plans, equitable relief shifted from purifying the decisional pro-
cess to achievement of results that demonstrated elimination of the seg-
regative impact of the past violation, albeit on the theory that this was
the only actual means of believing the decisional process had been puri-
fied of segregative intent.
Indeed, consider the history of Brown v. Board of Education itself.
One of the Brown consolidated cases, Briggs v. Elliott,2 °5 arose out of
the "deep South" area of Clarendon County, South Carolina. Clarendon
County's population was over eighty percent African-American, yet due
to voting discrimination, the African-Americans constituted an electoral
minority. 206 Average family income was extremely low, and African-
Americans almost entirely worked on absentee owners' farms or leased
small acreage. Social and political apartheid assured a continuous low
wage labor pool with few resources through which to escape even
intergenerationally. No pretense was made of equal segregated school
resources.
Brown H produced only freedom of choice school attendance,
which, given economic reprisals against the Briggs litigants themselves,
in no way changed the dual educational system. After Green, African-
American parents brought a suit against the Clarendon County School
Board. 7 for further equitable relief. The Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals en banc upheld injunctions to desegregate the school system. 0 8
By 1970, the white school population of the system numbered only 250
students compared with approximately 3,000 black children. School
officials estimated that fewer than 100 white children would remain
202. See generally Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526 (1979); Columbus Bd. of
Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979).
203. See generally Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
204. 391 U.S. 430 (1968). In 1965, after a suit was filed for injunctive relief against
maintenance of allegedly segregated schools, the Board, in order to remain eligible for federal
financial aid, adopted a "freedom-of-choice" plan for desegregating its schools. The plan
permitted students, except those entering the first and eighth grades, to choose annually between
the schools; those not choosing were assigned to the school previously attended. First and eighth
graders were required to affirmatively choose a school. See id. at 433-34.
205. 342 U.S. 350 (1952).
206. Briggs v. Elliott, 342 U.S. 350, 351-52 (1952).
207. See Brunson v. Board of Tr. of Sch. D. No. 1 of Clarendon Co., S. C., 429 F.2d 820 (4th
Cir. 1970).
208. James Ryan, "Schools, Race, and Money," 109 YALE L. REv. 249 (1999).
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post-Green. In a partial dissent, it was suggested that the white school
be de-segregated only to a degree under which "optimal" learning per-
formance would remain for white students, since redistributing minimal
white students would create only a token desegregation of the public
schools, a regrettable but useless remedy. 2° Judge Sobeloff's stinging
rebuke, embarrassingly contemporaneous to the Rizzo term, is worthy of
recall to confront the present perpetuation of injustice:
Certainly Brown had to do with the equalization of educational
opportunity; but it stands for much more. Brown articulated the truth
that Plessy chose to disregard: that relegation of blacks to separate
facilities represents a declaration by the state that they are inferior
and not to be associated with. By condemning the practice as "inher-
ently unequal" the Court, at long last, expunged the constitutional
principle of black inferiority and white supremacy introduced by
Dred Scott, and ordered the dismantling of the "impassable barrier"
upheld by that case. . . . [desegregation] is not founded upon the
concept that white children are a precious resource which should be
fairly apportioned.... The goal of social class segregation is scarcely
more defensible than that of racial segregation. The notion that pub-
lic authorities may use their powers and resources to erect a system of
social stratification is not only novel but also totally alien to the dem-
ocratic idea. . . . From a constitutional standpoint, a program of
apartheid according to social class is as impermissible as avowed
racial segregation - and as repugnant to the Equal Protection
Clause.21 °
Brown I did not outlaw any use of race as "inherently stigma-
tizing"-Justice O'Connor's view-but as Judge Sobeloff makes clear,
it outlawed the use of race invidiously to subordinate by race. The
wrong of subordination and its extent governs the scope of necessary
relief whether de jure by race or by structuring social class to produce
invidious racial social outcomes.
To understand Brown on its own terms would prove too dangerous.
It would undermine the partnership of local government and white citi-
zens to avoid desegregation. The State of Michigan runs its public edu-
cation through a State Board of Education which determines the
boundaries of local school boards. When the central city of Detroit was
found to be operating a dual school system by the siting of neighbor-
hood schools, district wide equitable relief was ordered. Private white
homeowners conveniently abandoned the magnificent residences of sec-
tions of Detroit for the all white suburbs, and their accompanying all
white schools. A virtually all Black public school population left in
209. See Brunson, 429 F.2d at 821-22.
210. Id. at 825-26.
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Detroit could not be desegregated without access to children and schools
in the exploding ring of municipalities surrounding the City. In the Mil-
liken v. Bradley cases,2 1 the Supreme Court early in the Rehnquist
period ruled absent an inter-district intentional segregation, or an intra-
district segregation intending to have and in fact causing an inter-district
segregative outcome, inter-district equitable relief, however necessary to
any remedy, was impermissible. Although the State intended to isolate
the center city-the only place large numbers of African-Americans
lived and could be intentionally segregated - and intended to insulate
the suburbs from any responsibility, matching school boards to munici-
pal boundaries was neutral to the massive white flight following the
finding of discrimination. The market for housing, education, exclusion
of others was merely constructed and brokered by the State. Having
never recovered, Detroit, the center of a population of more than four
million, stands a bombed out wasteland of rubble and occasional busi-
ness buildings abandoned by commercial enterprise, sporting a river-
front of miles of undeveloped, "temporary" macadam parking lots.
To the contrary of Judge Sobeloff in Brunson, Justice Rehnquist's
dissent in Columbus School Board v. Penick,21 2 followed the central par-
adox of Rizzo by connecting the substantive, invidious discriminatory
intent standard of equal protection to the scope of permissible relief:
Like causation analysis, the discriminatory-purpose requirement sen-
sibly seeks to limit court intervention to the rectification of conditions
that offend the Constitution-stigma and other harm inflicted by
racially motivated governmental action-and prevent unwarranted
encroachment on the autonomy of local government and private indi-
viduals which could result from a less structured approach.213
Then, Justice Powell joined Justice Rhenquist in his dissent in Rog-
ers v. Lodge,214 an at-large election system case, tied the State's intent to
identifiable officials: "The Mobile plurality [voting rights opinion] also
affirmed that the concept of 'intent' was no mere fiction, and held that
the District Court had erred in 'its failure to identify the state officials
whose intent in considered relevant.' ,215
This intent of state actors, however, must remain as metaphysical as
the nineteenth century notion of proximate cause to ensure no public
liability for foreseeable private reactions. Justice Powell discredits the
211. 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (Milliken I); 433 U.S. 267 (1977) (Milliken II).
212. 443 U.S. 449, 489 (1979).
213. Columbus School Bd. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 509 (1979) (Rhenquist, J., dissenting); see
also Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 542 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
214. 458 U.S. 613 (1982).
215. Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 628-29 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting) (quoting Mobile v.
Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 74 n.20 (1980)).
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Rogers majority because "Federal Courts thus are invited to engage in
deeply subjective inquiries into the motivations of local officials in
structuring local governments[;] . . . 'objective' factors should be the
focus of inquiry in vote dilution cases. 2 16 The following conundrum
results: relief must be aimed at and limited to the "objective" intent of
specific, subjective individuals employed by the public. The Empty
State strangely seeks intentional acts by government officials and then
strains credibility by privatizing those acts.
4. NEW RIGHTS: SUBORDINATING THE DEFENSELESS
The institutional restraint exercised by the Court in Rizzo and Flagg
Brothers subjects liberty and as property notions to legislative or admin-
istrative control. Justice Brennan complains angrily in his dissent in
Paul v. Davis2 17 that without procedural due process review, a local
police chief should not post the name and picture of a person as an
active shoplifter where charges have never been adjudicated because
"[t]he essential element of this type of § 1983 action is abuse of his
official position."21 8 Yet Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion views the
case as an action between two individuals.2 19 Such individual wrongs
are private relations to be governed by state law.
Deshaney v. Winnebago Co. 2 2 0 is the most explicit embodiment of
the new Rehnquist liberty in the substance of constitutional rights.22 1
After numerous trips to the emergency room with severe but suspicious
bruises, toddler Joshua Deshaney was removed from the custody of his
father, Randy, by social workers acting under state law authorization.2 22
The county department returned Joshua to his father.22 3 Shortly thereaf-
ter, on the next visit to the emergency room, Joshua's skull was found
fractured, leaving the four-year-old profoundly impaired for the rest of
his life.2 24 The case was not dismissed on standing or state action
grounds. By the time of Deshaney, the new regime is in place suffi-
ciently to allow the doctrine of due process to be limited to wrongs of
216. Id. at 629, 631.
217. 424 U.S. 693, 714 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
218. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. at 717 (footnote omitted).
219. Justice Rhenquist states, "Respondent's construction would seem almost necessarily to
result in every legally cognizable injury which may have been inflicted by a state official acting
under 'color of law' establishing a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 699.
220. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
221. See generally Laurence H. Tribe, The Curvature of Constitutional Space: What Lawyers
Can Learn From Modern Physics, 103 HARV. L. Rav. 1 (1989) (explaining the lowering of
governmental responsibility for exercises of power; and the importance of Deshaney).
222. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 192 (1989).
223. See id.
224. See id. at 193.
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intentional and strict causation. The State did not beat Joshua; his
father, Randy, swung the club.
The State's decision to return Joshua to Randy, while discretionary,
was not the cause of Joshua's harm in any way because constitutional
rights consist purely of negative orders not to do specific acts. Any
other subsequent actor relieves the state of responsibility. Any alterna-
tive would have to stem from non-existent affirmative obligations on
government impossible under the Constitution. Ironically, as a result of
the litigation, Winnebago County ultimately responded by ceasing all
voluntary removals of child custody in cases of suspected abuse and will
now only intervene under court order.225
Even the First Amendment's doctrinal guarantees of free speech
and free exercise and prohibition of the establishment of religion follow
similar constructions despite their seeming non-market activities.
Increasingly, the presence or absence of any government official as
sponsor or presenter is the factor that determines whether subsidy is
market based or a favoring of religious practices, and a religious display
on public property is laundered into a secular commodity celebration of
seasonal feasting.226
In Aguilar v. Felton,2 27 the presence of governmental officials,
school teachers, and the offering of special classes in sectarian schools
created the prohibited subsidy and symbolic connection violating the
prohibition of establishment of religion. At first glance, Justice
O'Connor's last minute overruling of Aguilar in the identical case in
Agostini v. FeltonEE8seems to break the reasoning of the Empty State by
finding no State responsibility or impact from the presence of a govern-
mental official. However, this conclusion would be wrong. First, the
holding further narrows the substantive First Amendment right, so it
does no damage to the line drawn to limit public responsibility in the
Empty State, and it does so in an opinion which only attempts to refute
the dissent, never offering positive reasons for the new doctrine. Sec-
225. Even being within the required jurisdiction of a governmental institution creates no duty
of care. Penn Ridge School District assigned D.R., an exceptional or handicapped female junior
high student, to graphics classes at Middle Bucks Area Vocational School. The classroom, often
unattended by the teacher, contained an unlocked bathroom in a non-visible area of the room.
D.R. alleged that several male students during the class fondled her and other girls' breasts and
genitalia, that one defendant repeatedly pulled or carried her into the bathroom forcing her to
masturbate him, and that others forced her and others to do the same. The plaintiffs did not report
the assaults but argued the school board should have provided safe and supervised classrooms.
The Third Circuit found that parents, not school authorities, were the primary supervisors of their
children and therefore responsible to protect D.R. and that no school official directly caused the
assaults. See D.R. v. Middle Bucks Area Vocational Tech. Sch., 972 F.2d 1364 (3rd Cir. 1992).
226. See generally Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
227. 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
228. 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
[Vol. 54:247
THE EMPTY STATE AND NOBODY'S MARKET
ondly, Justice O'Connor confuses helping a student through a public
interpreter 229 with subsidizing a sectarian school through provision of
courses and instructors the schools would otherwise need to provide.
Most outrageously, Justice O'Connor, the author of both Allen and J.A.
Croson, reasons that there is no true subsidy of sectarian education
because public schools will get the federal aid too! Consider the ridicu-
lous economics of her reasoning:
We are unwilling to speculate that all sectarian schools provide reme-
dial instruction and guidance counseling to their students, and are
unwilling to presume that the Board would violate Title I regulations
by continuing to provide Title I services to students who attend a
sectarian school that has curtailed its remedial instruction program in
response to Title I. Nor are we willing to conclude that the constitu-
tionality of an aid program depends on the number of sectarian
school students who happen to receive the otherwise neutral aid.
Zobrest did not turn on the fact that James Zobrest had, at the time of
litigation, been the only child using a publicly funded sign-language
interpreter to attend a parochial school.... But JUSTICE SOUTER does
not explain why a sectarian school would not have the same incentive
to "make patently significant cut-backs" in its curriculum no matter
where Title I services are offered, since the school would ostensibly
be excused from having to provide the Title I services itself. Because
the incentive is the same either way, [remedial services off campus
versus direct subsidy in kind at the sectarian school] we find no logi-
cal basis upon which to conclude that Title I services are an imper-
missible subsidy of religion when offered on-campus, but not when
offered off-campus.23°
Consider the hypocrisy of the comparison to the reasoning of her
opinion denying standing in Allen. In this case the State is not Empty,
but the competitive market makes no difference, so Nobody's Market
isn't a market. Persons with sufficient wealth to send their children to
private school get government subsidy to run religious schools-forty of
the forty-one private schools in the challenged program were sectarian.
Persons with sufficient wealth to send their children to private school get
protected from challenge to tax breaks for their schools even though
they explicitly discriminate on the basis of race. Minority parents forced
to send their children to public schools lack standing to challenge both
statutory and constitutionally barred State responsibility for continuing
apartheid in schools.
The Public Forum doctrine of the First Amendment's protection of
free speech has been turned inside out by the Empty State and Nobody's
229. See Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District, 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
230. See Agostoni v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 229-30 (1997).
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Market. According to Justice Roberts opinion in Hague v. CLO.,23
"[W]herever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemori-
ally been held in trust for the use of the public, and time out of mind,
have been used for purposes for assembly, communicating thoughts
between citizens, and discussing public questions.232 Soon after, this
doctrine was incorporated into the First Amendment.233 The right to a
public forum certainly has always been subject to time, place, and man-
ner restrictions suitable to the ordinary functions of the public's
property.
Under the Rehnquist Court, instead of government officials being
held to be trustees supervising public property for the access of the peo-
ple, their bosses, the Court equates government officials at the site as
equivalent to private managers. The people are presumed to be excluded
from public property except as consistent with and permitted by mana-
gerial prerogative to decide whether any such use at any time would
hypothetically interfere with the efficiency of the functional use of the
property. Thus, a solicitation table set beside a sidewalk between the
hundreds of feet separating a parking lot from a post office is prohibited,
not because it would interfere with foot traffic, but because a post office
processes mail and not speech. Public speakers are like trespassers on
any commercial property.2 34 Because the Empty State is simply the
choices of governmental officials acting in the stead of the market, they
are responsible to undertake as efficiently as possible their function,
which includes the efficient use of their property. The First Amendment
is an optional limit unless access is permitted discriminatorily on the
basis of message content.
It is a short step to allow governmental policy to delegate access
questions to managers in Nobody's Market. If FCC policy may not reg-
ulate what is permissible for children in competition with adults acces-
sing the internet or cable, who can? The market owners of the net or
channel, who will be under Nobody's Market pressure to respond to
buyers' complaints about taste and warnings and timing.235 And
because the government cannot enforce equal access to publicly accessi-
ble channels on the basis of race after Adarand's overruling of Metro
Broadcasting, Inc. v. F.C.C. ,236 such questions will be responsible only
to Nobody's Market. The carrier's managers are again simply price
takers.
231. 305 U.S. 496 (1939).
232. Hague, 305 U.S. at 515.
233. See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
234. See United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 (1990).
235. See Reno v. A.C.L.U., 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
236. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
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A Public Forum is now a private forum, because the First Amend-
ment no longer protects access, and because the Equal Protection clause
no longer applies to any State action like Flagg Brothers-anything
merely managed by officials, or created by legislative policy, or licensed
by the government, or by policy delegated administratively to private
actors, is merely legal background and not undertaken by government
officials.23 7 If the State leaves access regulation to Nobody's Market,
then nobody is responsible-not the State, not the delegatees of power
who are innocent minions of supply and demand. There is always
access to 101 cable channels or tens of thousands of web sites, as long as
the speaker or listener can pay and the mainstreaming effects of the Mar-
ket induce the manager to buy.23 8 Instead of publicly created property
being held in trust for all, the now private forum distributes access to
those whose messages are popular enough to be marketable. Only in
theory do unpopular messages gain access to listeners who will be
forced by debate the issues of the day from all sides, as the First Amend-
ment's relation to a robust democracy disappears behind private gates
and the limits of commercial messages.
In the Deshaney line of cases, what Justice Rehnquist neglected to
make clear was that the sharp distinction between negative and positive
liberty also had made Brown v Board of Education /I2 39 impossible.
Begin with official apartheid found unconstitutional in Brown I. Rights
which would create affirmative obligations on government to overcome
race prejudice would demand a remedy of integration. To Rehnquist,
after Brown I, this possibility must be rejected because to him rights
under the Constitution are stated linguistically as purely negative
prohibitions. Such rights of negative prohibition under Rehnquist's rea-
soning would be limited to damages for past governmental trespass of its
limits and an injunction to stop segregation. There is no conceptual
place in his sharp dichotomy for the actual chosen remedy of the Brown
Court, that is, desegregation. Desegregation could not be limited to
making whole specific past victims perhaps long removed from school.
Moreover, the problem in Brown was the apartheid regime of exclusion
aimed at no specific individuals. If affirmative injunctive relief to over-
come the effects of past apartheid on present equality are now to be
outside court power, Jim Crow and Plessy24° live again, and Brown24
237. See generally Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. DNC, 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
238. I am indebted to my colleague, Lili Levi, for sharpening the inside-out Public/Private
function idea. See generally Lili Levi, Rationals and Rationalizations: Regulating the Electronic
Media 38, Jul~umAiucs 515 (1998).
239. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
240. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 483 (1896).
241. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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becomes an historical curiosity.
In dissent in DeShaney, Justice Brennan resurrected the conceptual
system of Shelley v. Kraemer2 42 (state court acts in choosing to enforce
contracts where doing so requires policy approval of private racial cove-
nants on property alienation are unconstitutional); Baker v. Carr2 43
(standing requires a party who can give sufficient fight to define the
legal power challenged); Hague v. C.LO.244 (§ 1983 includes policies
which distribute or delegate power to act); Brown (the state is responsi-
ble for the consequences of policies of invidious discrimination); and
Swann245 (the scope of equitable relief extends as far as necessary to
eradicate the effects of illegal delegations of power). Justice Brennan
argued that no understanding of rights as affirmative obligations was
necessary. All that was required and indeed enacted in past doctrine was
the recognition that government was responsible for the foreseeable con-
sequences of its actions in enacting enabling policies. If government
gave one a gun, showed its use, and, while winking, looked the other
way during the gun's use, it acted even though physically an individual
shot the gun and the government physically did nothing for or against
the private action. The real question is the exercise of power and the
responsible limits of power, not action or inaction in power's
deployment.
Justice Rehnquist connects intent with scope of permissible relief
because his image of a public-private distinction prevents courts, as well
as administrators who fear court-imposed constitutional responsibilities,
from affecting private choice in the relief of past public wrongs: "[i]n a
school system with racially imbalanced schools, every school board
action regarding construction, pupil assignment, transportation, annexa-
tion and temporary facilities will promote integration, aggravate segre-
gation or maintain segregation. '' 246 He maintains this image despite the
recognition that, as a principle of causation that governs the determina-
tion of both violation and scope of relief, some proven violations and
their effects will go unrelieved: "Virtually every urban area in this
country has racially and ethnically identifiable neighborhoods, doubtless
resulting from a melange of past happenings prompted by economic
considerations, private discrimination, discriminatory school assign-
ments, or a desire to reside near people of one's own race or ethnic
background. 247
242. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
243. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
244. 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
245. Swann v. Charlotte Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
246. Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 433 U.S. 449, 510 (1979).
247. Id. at 512.
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It would seem that Rehnquist's Rizzo construct would favor reading
Brown for a narrower holding that Equal Protection violations of spe-
cific children's empirically demonstrable educational performance defi-
ciencies are the only injuries with standing to be remedied, and only to
the extent of redressing those empirically demonstrable harms. Cer-
tainly, if resegregation occurred due to white private residential choices,
especially if educational performance remained stable, then judicial rem-
edy would be inappropriate. The State is Empty of responsibility, and
the fault lies with Nobody's housing market. But the Rehnquist agenda
is larger so that the reinterpretation of the holding of Brown I bears no
resemblance to the Brown opinion and overrules Brown H. The
announcement is explicit in Jenkins v. State of Missouri,248 preventing
recent voluntary remedy of past discrimination cases, and a series of
voting rights cases.
C. Rewriting Brown v. Board of Education
In its third Jenkins (Jenkins III) opinion,249 the Supreme Court
effectively ended the District Court's jurisdiction of eighteen years of
attempted remedy of a dual school system established by both the State
of Missouri and Kansas City. Under Federal District Court order, the
Kansas City School Board attempted a magnet school approach to try to
re-cover from steady white flight resistance to desegregation. ° Justice
Thomas's concurrence bluntly rejects Brown H:
[t]he District Court's remedial orders are in tension with two com-
monsense principles. First, the District Court retained jurisdiction
over the implementation and modification of the remedial decree,
instead of terminating its involvement after issuing its remedy....
Second, the District Court failed to target its equitable remedies in
this case specifically to cure the harm suffered by the victims of seg-
regation .... It goes without saying that only individuals can suffer
from discrimination, and only individuals can receive the remedy." 1
A more circumspect Justice Rehnquist for the majority, sees Jen-
kins III as a Rizzo problem:
[T]he District Court dismissed as "irrelevant" the "State's argument
that the present condition of the facilities [was] not traceable to
unlawful segregation." Instead the District Court focused on its
responsibility to "remed[y] the vestiges of segregation" and to
248. 962 F.2d 762 (8th Cir. 1992).
249. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995).
250. See Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 76-77.
251. Id. at 134, 136-37. Conveniently, Justice Thomas' support for his view of judicial limits
developed in a lengthy "history" of equity jurisdiction stops before reaching the twentieth
century, in fact, right about the time of Plessy.
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"implemen[t] a desegregation plan which [would] maintain and
attract non-minority enrollment., 25 2
The limitation on remedy preserves the white flight of Nobody's
Market by denying the opinion as written in Brown. The harm in Brown
stemmed from the policy of apartheid as it was implemented in Claren-
don County in the schools, in the police and fire departments, in the
denial of voting rights, in the licensing of businesses, and in the control
of white businessmen of every institution of power connected to govern-
ment by the white owners of all large economic concerns in the County.
Judge Sobeloff knew that. Judge John Minor Wisdom in the same case
knew that. Clarence Thomas does not. As he announced in his Jenkins
opinion that reading Brown "correctly" means that every use of race by
government demanded judicial strict scrutiny of compelling government
interests before legislation can be upheld.253
Justice Thomas' rewriting of Brown in most ways simply articu-
lates Justice O'Connor's holdings in J.A. Croson and Shaw v. Reno. It
matches Justice O'Connor's own rewriting of Shelley v. Kraemer.254
Finding any governmental use of race suspect requiring strict scrutiny,
not only removes the Carolene Products understanding of the judicial
role as limited to preventing majorities from invidiously hiding behind
differences over policy, but it also prevents the majority from admitting
responsibility for the subordination it promotes within the necessarily
subsidized inequalities of Nobody's Market. Brown must be rewritten to
prevent the voluntary remedy acknowledged in dicta in Swann. There
the "radical" Chief Justice Warren Burger wrote:
School authorities are traditionally charged with broad power to for-
mulate and implement educational policy and might well conclude,
for example, that in order to prepare students to live in a pluralistic
society each school should have a prescribed ratio of Negro to white
students reflecting the proportion for the district as a whole. To do
this as an educational policy is within the broad discretionary powers
of school authorities; absent a finding of constitutional violation,
however, that would not be within the authority of a federal court. As
with any equity case, the nature of the violation determines the scope
of the remedy. 5
Significantly, the first departure from this position is found in the
opinion signed only by Justice Powell, in his rejection of Carolene
Products in one of the very few true affirmative action cases, Regents of
252. Id. at 76 (citations omitted).
253. Id. at 118-123.
254. See City of Raymond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S.
630 (1993).
255. Swann v. Charlotte Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ. 402 U.S. 1, 17 (1971).
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the Univ. of California v. Bakke.256 It is this part of O'Connor's J.A.
Croson opinion relying on Powell that fails to gather a Court majority
subsequently, and specifically draws Justice Thurgood Marshall's
dissent:
The majority's view that remedial measures undertaken by munici-
palities with black leadership must face a stiffer test of Equal Protec-
tion Clause scrutiny than remedial measures undertaken by
municipalities with white leadership implies a lack of political matur-
ity on the part of this Nation's elected minority officials that is totally
unwarranted.... In my view, the circumstances of this case under-
score the importance of not subjecting to a strict scrutiny straitjacket
the increasing number of cities which have recently come under
minority leadership and are eager to rectify, or at least prevent the
perpetuation of, past racial discrimination. In many cases, these cit-
ies will be the ones with the most in the way of prior discrimination
to rectify.257
The doctrine of J.A. Croson and the rewriting of Brown, have been
so successful that Justice Rehnquist could simply announce in Jenkins,
without citation, that the use of race as a criteria of distribution in order
to remedy past social discrimination could never count as a compelling
government interest and that the use of race even in a voluntary remedy
of governmental past discrimination, while possibly compelling, would
never be narrowly tailored enough for strict scrutiny if the remedy bene-
fited anyone other than those individuals specifically harmed by that
discrimination.258
Having gutted Brown II by limiting relief to specific past victims,
and refusing to counter white flight, Justice Rehnquist now forecloses
the district court facing a guilty state-wide party from the alternative of
reparations through magnets. The crime is done, and the perpetrators
are given government protection of the illegal spoils. Justice O'Connor
again announced the result for a fractured Court in the federal voluntary
remedy case, Adarand Construction Co. v. Pena,2 59 , effectively overrul-
ing Fullilove v. Klutznick.260 The federal highway construction program
provided a bonus to successful bidders as general contractors who hired
socially disadvantaged sub-contractors. 26 1 First, a white contractor was
found to have standing under Associated General Contractors because
of a barrier partially constructed by race, among other factors of social
256. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
257. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 554-55.
258. Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 889, 913 (1996).
259. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
260. 448 U.S. 448 (1988).
261. See Adarand Constr. Co. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 204 (1995).
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disadvantage, to all the formal market opportunities offered by the
State.262 While Adarand could not plead the likelihood of losing any
specific future contract the subsidy, not a quota, could hurt Adarand in
the future. Of course, African-Americans have known since emancipa-
tion that every policy decision is distributive, a subsidy to the political
winners, to the majority, which affects those who did not benefit. It is
no accident that white Richmond distributed 99.33% of its public con-
tracts to white contractors in the five years preceding the election of the
barely majority-black city council which tried to limit the former racial
privilege.
Second, and more egregiously, from Rizzo, Lyons, and DeShaney,
we know that the question of who gets into federal court and the delinea-
tion of the limits of even equitable relief under the Rehnquist Court's
requirements of strict causation and remedies limited to specific victims
requires that the same strict intentional causation also redefines the sub-
stance of rights, including equal protection. Yet in Adarand, following
AGC, a contractor who cannot show that they will remain in business,
bid on any future projects, win or lose any bids, or be specifically
harmed in the future, not only has standing, but has a present injury
because of a general subsidy program that disadvantages him. It would
seem, based partially on the results of the past history of discrimination
from whatever source, that opportunity of success for whites is greater
than the likelihood of school success for blacks. Therefore, denying
white opportunity is the same as denying black certainty.
The Rehnquist shell game-equating the requirements of jus-
ticiability to the limitation of equitable relief powers, and equating both
to the limitations of substantive rights-marries the affirmative protec-
tion of white opportunity with the negative liberty of DeShaney to com-
plete the rewriting of Brown I. Judge O'Scanlein's opinion for the Ninth
Circuit in Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson26 3 upheld California's
proposition 209. It prohibited any affirmative action or voluntary rem-
edy using race or gender. Judge O'Scanlein describes "conventional"
equal protection by citing Adarand, Shaw, and J.A. Croson, with no cite
to Brown at all, for the proposition that any use of race is odious to a
free people and therefore unconstitutional.264 Since that is the doctrine
to be applied, O'Scanlein concludes, "A law that prohibits the State
from classifying individuals by race or gender a fortiori does not class-
ify individuals by race or gender. '265 The focus is on invidiousness;
262. Id. at 212.
263. 110 F.3d 1431 (9th Cir. 1997).
264. See Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 110 F.3d 1431, 1439 (9th Cir. 1997).
265. Id. at 1440.
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thus, the basis of Brown has disappeared. Using no gender cases, but
equating gender with race, the opinion conveniently ignores the
Supreme Court's entire line of gender discrimination cases. Most
importantly, this selective legal account completely masks its own logic.
Preventing race considerations by government protects white privilege
against all racial minorities, despite the fact that any majority will hardly
routinely disfavor itself. Indeed, that is the very premise of judicial
review of constitutional rights, justified in order to resist exploitation by
a democratic majority. Of course, the Rehnquist system itself is yet to
replace the Carolene Product's solution to the "counter-majoritarian"
challenge to the institutional limits of judicial activism.
Compare the Empty State's operation of the death penalty in the
1987 case McClesky v. Kemp.266 The Baldus study of 2,000 Georgia
capital murder cases in the 1970s found that the death penalty was
assessed in twenty-two percent of the cases involving Black defendants
and white victims, eight percent of the cases involving white defendants
and white victims, one percent of the cases involving black defendants
and black victims, and three percent of the cases involving white defend-
ants and black victims. 267 Thus defendants killing whites were 4.3 times
as likely to die as those killing blacks.2 68 The study eliminated 230
other explanations than race for this result. 69 The District Court found
the study irrelevant to a black defendant on the grounds that proof of
intentional racial discrimination required more than mere statistical dis-
parity. Obviously, the studies met this requirement by correcting for so
many other factors, especially when read in light of Georgia's history of
dual race court systems and a criminal law which did not even make
killing a black person a crime under certain circumstances. The require-
ments of the Empty State led the Rehnquist Court to limit Equal Protec-
tion under requirements of strict causation to produce the same result:
"Thus, to prevail under the Equal Protection Clause, McClesky must
prove that the decisionmakers in his case acted with discriminatory pur-
pose. He offers no evidence specific to his own case that would support
an inference that racial considerations played a part in his sentence."27
The Government prosecutor merely placed McClesky in the Georgia
system, just as the social workers merely returned baby Joshua to harm's
way. The jury of his peers, randomly drawn from a venire, convicted
McClesky to pay with his life, as if no different than the random price
produced by irresponsible price takers in Nobody's Market. The death
266. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
267. See McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 286 (1987).
268. See id. at 287.
269. See id.
270. Id. at 292.
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penalty is a policy of patterns and practices. Adarand gets contracts from
a policy of market bidding which cannot be racially marked. McClesky
dies from a policy which is racially marked. The fact that race is
explicit, even as only one factor, dooms the program in Adarand. The
fact that race is never explicit formally, despite its certainty in proof in
the study, dooms McClesky. Adarand has standing and a right,
McClesky dies.
Substantively, in Adarand, Justice O'Connor, claiming to restore
the fabric of fifty years of prior decisions overrules Metro Broadcasting
Inc. v. F.CC.27 1 Initially, Adarand requires strict scrutiny of every
racial remedy, whether federal or state, conveniently ignoring the differ-
ence made by section five of the Fourteenth Amendment, which under-
lies the decision in Fullilove v. Klutznick, and further drawing into
question the Federal Voting Rights Act. Once again Clarence Thomas
explains the logical end point of the more circumspect O'Connor plural-
ity, in terms which could have come directly out of Plessy v. Ferguson:
I agree with the majority's conclusion that strict scrutiny applies to
all government classifications based on race.... I believe there is a
"moral [and] constitutional equivalence," between laws designed to
subjugate a race and those that distribute benefits on the basis of race
in order to foster some notion of equality.... As far as the Constitu-
tion is concerned, it is irrelevant whether a government's racial clas-
sifications are drawn by those who wish to oppress a race or by those
who have a sincere desire to help those thought to be disadvantaged.
There can be no doubt that the paternalism that appears to lie at the
heart of this program is at war with the principle of inherent equality
that underlies and infuses our Constitution .... So-called "benign"
discrimination teaches many that because of chronic and apparently
immutable handicaps, minorities cannot compete with them without
their patronizing indulgence.... These programs stamp minorities
with a badge of inferiority and may cause them to develop dependen-
cies or to adopt an attitude that they are "entitled" to preferences....
In my mind, government-sponsored racial discrimination based on
benign prejudice is just as noxious as discrimination inspired by mali-
cious prejudice.272
Tell it to the Black council members in Richmond. Sell it to the
Black sharecroppers and tenant farmers in Clarendon County. Bellow it
from the bully pulpit of the Supreme Court. By definition, a subsidy for
disadvantage given to white contractors so they won't be hurt hiring
minority contractors despite the discipline of Nobody's Market, a market
constructed by the licenses, tax breaks, lack of enforcement, of decades
271. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
272. Adarand Constr. Co. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 240-41 (1995).
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of Jim Crow's nods and winks, harms innocent white established busi-
ness. At the same time, an Empty State, where power including the
distribution of hundreds of millions of highway dollars, has no apparent
consequences and the government actors and their patrons are truly
empty only of shame.
Compare Justice Thomas to Plessy:
Thomas claims that: "[Government] cannot make us equal; it can
only recognize, respect and protect us as equal before the law."
Whereas Plessy explains: "If the two races are to meet upon terms
of social equality, it must be the result of natural affinities. . . and a
voluntary consent of individuals. Legislation is powerless to eradicate
racial instincts, or to abolish distinctions based upon physical
differences."273
As Professor Kendall Thomas demonstrates, the very discursive
practice of Justice Thomas, makes race the classification of identity
which Thomas uses to demand a constitutional norm of "color-blind-
ness," hiding the voices of the historically subordinated members of
minority groups who have felt the material force of state backed
supremacy.274 Thomas does not want to return to the era of free labor
and liberty of contract, hiding Jim Crow in the mantle of contractual
liberty of purely, mutually, voluntary, private, formal opportunities. No,
he wants government to secure the private exclusion of minorities from
the mainstream cultural experience. The Empty State and Nobody's
Market are perfect accomplices. What could more neutrally hide the
racial exclusion than wringing non-racialized merit out of the conditions
described by William Julius Wilson.275
To struggle within the terms of the Empty State and Nobody's Mar-
ket forces any search for viable solutions to harms done to individuals to
focus on strict causation-who did it? Whoever did must pay or go to
jail. The punishment must fit the crime. The remedy must be no more
than necessary to pay for the victimization-so that "innocent" persons
stuck in our market web of interdependence are not made to pay. Those
innocents may or may not turn their charity to those inevitable groups of
persons left at the end of the market's marginal accommodations.
The specific causation standard of Warth limits court access to spe-
cific victims of past state apartheid. The limiting of § 1983 actions by
the same specific causation standard of cognizable harm removes
apartheid from the intentional, but now mere, use of race in Brown. The
273. Kendall Thomas, Reading Clarence Thomas (manuscript in possession of the author).
274. Thomas, supra note 273.
275. See generally WntAm JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANrAGED: Tim INNER CITY,
THE UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1988).
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equity relief available on proof of constitutional violation cramps flexi-
ble remedy to only the consequences of public officials' intentional past
statements. All remove legally guarded access to Nobody's Market. As
in Plessy, we must not be individually judged by our voluntary
encounters and exclusions, but contrary to Plessy, the primacy of racial
status need never be legalized. It merely needs to be tolerated in the
lack of constitutionalized power in an Empty State mechanically serv-
icing free market merit. We are now equal before the law because we
are employees, regardless of our wealth or lack of it, regardless of our
homes or access to bridges for shelter, but not simply equal before the
law because we are members of differing races.
This is the double bind of our oppression - both the fact of injus-
tice and the systematic denial of responsibility for those realities
oppress. Under the Empty State, we can only try to prevent discrimina-
tion, help mobility of all, help choices now that market risks have been
internalized as the cost of entering the market, and are presumably
reflected in the market wage. These very solutions, however, cover up
the historical responsibility of the state's production of power and the
law's distribution of productive capacity that underlies access to
resources and other social empowerment. Once the solutions directed
against past oppression are limited to "individual rational choice" and
"individual opportunity," the ability to trace state responsibility and
complicity disappears into Nobody's Market, freezing the already
acquired fruits of past discrimination and making further attempts at
attacking past inequality a new cost to someone else. In effect, now all
are innocents in the new regime. The Empty State pardons all market
participants.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL ECONOMY AND STATE RESPONSIBILITY
The critique thus far is dialectical. What the Rehnquist Court takes
out of Constitutional rights in the name of local autonomy to exclude
minorities simultaneously frames a reference for producing a more, not
utopian, but more democratic system of practices of governance, includ-
ing constitutional interpretations utilized by judges in defining the rights
necessary to a democratic organization of social life. The argument pro-
vides an alternative ideology of constitutional economy to that of either
the progressive liberal republicanism associated with the Brown period,
or the Rehnquist Court's Empty State/Nobody's Market.276
Law should be practiced in ways that do not defeat democracy, and
276. My argument is ultimately compatible with the ideas of Jurgen Habermas and Roberto
Unger, although differentiated in strategy and policy from both on epistemic grounds. See
generally JURGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACrS AND NoRMs: CONTRIBUTrIONs To A DISCOURSE
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in such practices, for the need to recover possible suppressed alternative
political economies, particularly in the legal strategies most directly
related to work and production.277 Of necessity, the meaning of a lived
democracy will be contested. Such interdependent struggles, after all,
establish the very justice of democratic claims to the power to mediate
social conflicts. The key is to demand that constitutional interpretation
by unelected judges be rationally linked to constitutional structure, and
then rationally linked to justifications based on democracy. Of course,
no changes will be objective or neutral, including the massive rewriting
done by the present Court. Like all exercises of power, strategic content
must be defended.
The interpretive system of Constitutional meaning employed by the
present Court is incoherent because it has no way of accounting for the
phenomenon of current struggles for civil justice in America. The newly
abandoned Carolene Products7 8 justification of judicial review of the
textually structured connection of enumerated limited powers of govern-
ment and the content of individual rights had the merit of explaining the
anti-majoritarian role of the Court as preserving the fairness of legisla-
tive processing of multiple and conflicting claims.
A substantive implementation of Carolene Products as an answer
to the anti-majoritarian paradox of judicial review coherently preserves
both the aim and meaning of democracy if democracy is taken as a sub-
stantive Constitutional requirement. Note that, except in style, this meth-
odology is not a simple return to Carolene Products. Neither is this a
call for amorphous communitarian or utopian politics. This is a call for
substantive, authentic democracy as the focus of both legislative and
judicial politics and justifications of power. Authentic democracy
demands participation in the construction of power in the name of
society.
Three distinct changes would increase the democratic accountabil-
ity of Constitutional adjudication and may be loosely captured by the
label, "Substantive Carolene Products." First, and at a minimum, the
courts should be forced to justify the inevitable distribution of power
contained in every adjudication by explaining the decision's contribution
to and effect on democracy or democratic accountability.
Second, judicial interpretation must focus on the facts of the con-
flict over power within society represented by the parties to any case.
THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY (1996); ROBERTO UNGER, WHAT SHOULD LEGAL ANALYSIS
BECOME? (1996). See supra note 4 for any disagreements with both.
277. See generally Axel Honneth, Work and Instrumental Action, 9 NEW GERMAN CRIIQUE 31
(1982).
278. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
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The current Supreme Court has increasingly resorted to purely formal
rhetoric, empty of any explanatory content, settling nothing and generat-
ing confusion.279 To the contrary, the internal meaningfulness of legal
argument requires the recognition of continuity between present cases
and a contested past, not an ahistoric past. Explaining the mediating
function of adjudication thus requires relating the relevance of past con-
flict to the present case, an inherently factual representation, before a
formalistic rule should be extended. The more fact, the more supporta-
ble the continuation or change of legal power in the present litigation.28 °
Law is made undemocratic in a step-by-step process that reduces each
complex struggle to a formal contest over a rule. In the next episode or
case this rule appears as a settled part of the now natural background
that forms the context of the next ruling. As Judith Shklar has noted,
confusing this procedure for having factually ended the past case's
stakes commits the naturalistic fallacy, confusing language for truth, and
is therefore inherently conservative as a practice.281 It conservatively
overemphasizes the power of past prevailing parties and their relative
power, and dismisses the relevance of losing parties. This is, of course,
entirely counterfactual to modern notions of economics, history, and
political choice theory. Legal meaning, and therefore, legal power is
contested, and should be produced on that basis. Legislation in itself
does not end conflict even as it codifies conflict for further legal
politics. 282
Third, since democracy-in-fact depends upon the participation of
relative equals, the courts should acknowledge the conditions of society
that tie each of us to the others of our communities. The courts should
seek the most appropriate democratic interpretation of legal text avail-
able as measured by its contribution to overcoming the alienation of
unjustified force, that is subordination. The stark failure of the twentieth
century has been witnessing those who would impose their own utopias
upon vast segments of the world's population. Subordination fuels the
will to democracy rising across the world. It is not a utopian vision of
justice driving that force. Rather, it is the will to overcome the condi-
tions of injustice in each location which demands the sharing of power
and equalizing the conditions sanctioning suffering. Before we have to
worry about formal conditions of justice in order to define the deserving,
we have plenty of injustice to correct, to overcome.
279. See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (overruling the
morass generated by National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 323 (1976)).
280. See TERRENCE ANDERSON AND WILLIAM TWINING, TAKING FAcrs SERIOUSLY (1995).
281. JUDITH SHKLAR, LEGALISM (1964).
282. See Patrick Gudridge, Legislation in Legal Imagination: Introductory Exercises, 37 U.
MIAMI L. REv. 493 (1983).
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Each of these counters to the present Court are consistent with our
present Constitutional text and its generation.283 Democracy is the deci-
sional politics of free individuals. Free individuals, however, depend on
the conditions of their interdependency within a complex division of
labor. If each self takes the measure of their power from their relations
to the others within a system capable of social stability, indeed social
advance, then a kind of equivalency is necessary for democracy in fact.
That equality is not a license or a subsidy to consume goods or cultural
experience. Here lies liberalism's fatal concession and mistake. Making
distribution of wealth available for consumption the key framework of
social analysis, misses the point that we make ourselves, we don't just
buy our identities. Rather, it is equal access to produce and contribute
within a division of labor based on mutual recognition of one's own self
in the conditions experienced by all others which is necessary to democ-
racy in fact. Furthermore, it is the risks of being subordinated in a pre-
vailing, thus historical, division of labor which leads us to demand
democracy, and then authentic democracy, as the only structure by
which to solve social conflict over the terms of social production.
If the system of rights is elaborated and extended under such
favorable circumstances, each citizen can perceive, and come to
appreciate, citizenship as the core of what holds people together, of
what makes them at once dependent upon, and responsible for each
other. They see that private and public autonomy presuppose each
other in maintaining and improving necessary conditions for pre-
ferred forms of life. They intuitively realize that they can succeed in
fairly regulating their private autonomy only by making an appropri-
ate use of their civic autonomy, and that they are in turn empowered
to do so only on a social basis that makes them, as private persons,
sufficiently interdependent. They learn to conceive citizenship as the
frame for that dialectic between legal and actual equality from which
283. The Empty State and Nobody's Market are not an inevitable construction of our
Constitutional meaning. It has frequently been observed that our Constitutional polity, based on
republican representational democracy, is one of the weakest forms of democracy. It is certainly
the case that a parliamentary form of democracy is more responsive to the electorate even if not
completely participatory as another form of representative democracy. While we might under
some circumstances demand a new Constitution based on participatory or stronger forms of
democracy, the Rehnquist revolution intentionally suggests that our present Constitution cannot be
made to function more democratically than the Empty State. This is untrue. Less government, or
more accurately, less acknowledged government power, does not equate to democracy, let alone
more liberty. In fact, clever rhetoric making such undefended and incoherent claims may be
designed to push people who feel oppressed toward militaristic attacks on democracy, or even the
federal courts of Oklahoma. While a new political form of constitutionality could be suggested,
that will not be the burden of this argument. Nor is a Constitutional convention necessary, even
assuming that a better, more just social order might in theory be invented. See generally DANIEL
LAZARE, THE FROZEN REPUBLIC: How THE CONSTrrION IS PARALYZING DEMOCRAcY (1997).
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fair and preferable living conditions for all of them can emerge."'
The inquiry is power. The question is strategy. We know the State
is never empty, restricted to governmental officials' actions, and the
market cannot be run by Nobody's gremlin. Our experience of power
connects the two in ways from which our social interdependence allows
no historical escape. Let us suppose a new political economy that
acknowledges we are all on the inside of this moment of history, one
that aims at overcoming injustice, rather than establishing the idea of
transcendental utopian justice, that justice therefore lies in conditions,
including broadly the conditions of culture and therefore language.
Thus, the experience of a less painful (less alienated) reproduction of our
social relations seems directly related to the authenticity of personal par-
ticipation in the exercise of power - the democracy of social life.
The Rehnquist Court, however, limits access to the only forum rep-
resenting all of us trying to maintain our communities' competitiveness
in a global economy, and privileges a few to escape their social respon-
sibilities in wealthy enclaves. An agency of politics directed against this
injustice can be imagined based upon the assumption of responsibility
for our interdependence,2 85 and this politics can serve to mobilize
demand for the capacity of any person, without abdicating her identity,
to work under conditions of authentic participation in the way how and
what we do constructs our understanding.
While the world economy operates largely uncoupled from any
political frame, national governments are restricted to fostering the mod-
ernization of their national economies. As a consequence, they have to
adapt national welfare-systems to what is called the ability to compete
internationally. So they are forced to allow the sources of solidarity to
dry up still further. One alarming signal is the emergence of an under-
class. More and more, marginalized groups are gradually segmented off
from the rest of society. those who are no longer able to change their
social lot on their own, are left to their own. Segmentation does not
mean, however, that a political community can simply shed itself of a
"superfluous" section without suffering consequences. In the long term,
there are at least three consequences (which are becoming obvious
already in countries like the U.S.). First, an underclass creates social
tensions that can only be controlled by repressive means: The construc-
tion of jails becomes a growth industry. Second, social destitution and
physical immiserization cannot be locally contained; the deterioration of
284. Habermas, supra note 29, at 135.
285. See Kenneth Casebeer, Work on a Labor Theory of Meaning; 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 1637
(1989); see also Joseph Raz, THE MORALrrY OF FREEDOM (1986) The author disagrees with the
conclusions and recommendations drawn from Prof. Raz's arguments.
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the ghettos spreads to the infrastructure of cities and regions, permeating
the pores of the whole society. Finally, and in our context most relevant,
the segmentation of minorities who are robbed of an audible voice in the
public sphere brings an erosion of morality with it, which certainly
undermines the integrative force of democratic citizenship.286
One cannot doubt that the present members of the Supreme Court
do not represent "We the People". Indeed their constructions and distri-
butions of legal empowerment through the Empty State and Nobody's
Market benefit a favored few. In the Empty State because the market is
nobodies, wealth and exclusionary privilege are not the product of state
protection but the "natural" private order that must be protected against
governmental (not State) interference. They must be protected because
of natural right to accumulation, and/or for the good of the market and
because there is never a causal connection to subordination tight enough
to justify "intervention". Therefore the links between State/Market doc-
trine in a variety of cases and their permission to create actual distribu-
tionally oppressive results exists as what's mine is mine and you have
no claim, no defendant, no remedy, and no right to breach the veil of
protection of existing grandfathered power. Ominously, the rich and
white have the enclaves and the malls, and the rest have the streets
which have not yet been closed. Therefore, the new argument continues,
the Brown v. Board of Education's attack on the invidiousness of neutral
apartheid has disappeared in doctrine. It is part of what it making segre-
gation today protected by law in work, housing, schools, etc. Surely this
Court has not met the burden of justifying its counter-majoritarian exer-
cise of judicial review at the core of judicial legitimacy. This Court in
fact reduces the degree of authentic democratic experience available to
the most subordinated members of our community.
As a matter of international competitiveness, the abandonment of
our human capital in favor of increased protection of accumulation,
often to be exported to foreign investment is unwise.287 But it is also
retrenching democracy. That should enrage those of us who believe that,
at least, legal power can only be constructed legitimately by full partici-
pation in democratic decisions governing our social relationships. It is
more outrageous that the anti-democratic practices of this court should
286. See Habermas, supra note 29, at 136.
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States since 1980, especially in contrast to all other industrialized, first world nations, see Peter
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be constructed by ideological assumptions about race, gender, and class
that reduce the power of our least favored citizens of all races to resist
discrimination and gain equal treatment in fact in our democratic soci-
ety. For its knowing perpetuation of human suffering this Supreme
Court has much to answer.
